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“No More No-Poach”: An Antitrust
Plaintiff’s Guide
Amanda Triplett*
Abstract
It may seem that agreements between employers not to hire or
solicit employees from each other would be illegal under the
Sherman Act’s prohibition of conspiracies to fix prices or allocate
markets. However, the complexity of this issue pushes the
boundaries of antitrust law. But the core principals of antitrust law
are tailored to reject them. In a market of employers, where firms
are competitors, no-poach restraints have horizontal elements
subject to a harsher standard of antitrust review. Firms that enter
into these arrangements bypass legal methods to protect against the
harms of employee loss, such as a non-compete agreement. Just as
in a classic cartel, these firms are motivated by a desire to fix wages,
and worse, weaken transparent wage information in the labor
market. Possible vertical elements of these restraints, such as in
franchise systems, should not alter this analysis—despite potential
Copperweld or unilateralism defenses.
There is a strong case in antitrust jurisprudence for per se or
quick-look condemnation, including through the use of the huband-spoke conspiracy doctrine. In the case of specialized employees,
in particular, extended rule of reason condemnation is possible.
Once an antitrust plaintiff meets the initial burden, it will be
unlikely that a defendant can raise a pro-competitive justification
defense. Only in limited circumstances are no-poach agreements
truly ancillary to integrations between firms, necessary for the
larger venture, and pro-competitive in their purpose.

*
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I. An Introduction to No-Poach Agreements
A. From Apple to McDonald’s
In the early 2000s, several Silicon Valley tech companies
(including Adobe, Apple, Google, Intel, Intuit, Lucasfilm, and
Pixar) entered into an interconnected web of agreements
prohibiting the parties from cold calling or soliciting each other’s
employees.1 Each agreement included the “active involvement and
participation of a company under the control of the late Steven P.
Jobs . . . and/or a company whose board shared at least one
member of Apple’s board of directors.”2 It is likely that the
agreements were negotiated CEO to CEO.3 Subsequent details
1. See In re High-Tech Emp. Antitrust Litig., 856 F. Supp. 2d 1103, 1110
(N.D. Cal. 2012) (“[E]ach company placed the names of the other company’s
employees on a ‘Do Not Cold Call’ list and instructed recruiters not to cold call the
employees of the other company.”).
2. See id. (describing the role of Apple and Steven Jobs in orchestrating the
web of agreements).
3. See id. at 1117 (“Based on Mr. Jobs’s attempt to negotiate a ‘Do Not Cold
Call’ agreement directly with Palm’s CEO, it is reasonable to infer that such
agreements were negotiated directly CEO to CEO.”).
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were then negotiated, executed, monitored, and concealed by
senior executives at each participating company.4
The employees never agreed to this arrangement by signing
non-compete agreements.5 Yet, this was the effect of the
conspiracy; the agreement fractured competition in the tech labor
market, depressing the “total compensation and mobility of all
Defendants’ employees.”6 The lone defector in this agreement,
Palm, Inc., stated that the “proposal that . . . neither company will
hire the other’s employees, regardless of the individual’s desires, is
not only wrong, it is likely illegal.”7 There is some evidence that his
assumption was correct. The Department of Justice (DOJ) argued
that this conspiracy was per se illegal and the parties responded
by entering consent decrees.8 However, because consent decrees
were entered, the court never explicitly held that these agreements
were per se illegal.9
Consider also the plight of Leinani Deslandes.10 She began as
an entry-level employee at a McDonald’s franchise, was promoted
to shift-manager, then department manager, and began
coursework to become a general manager.11 She stated that her
course was cancelled when her supervisors learned she was
pregnant.12 Although Deslandes sought a comparable position at a
4. See id. at 1110 (describing the role of senior executives in enforcing the
no-poach agreements).
5. See id. (“Defendants’ employees were not informed of, nor did they agree
to, the terms of any of the agreements.”).
6. See id. at 1111 (explaining the importance of cold-calling and
non-solicitation on this labor market).
7. See id. at 1112 (describing Palm’s rejection of Apple’s no-poach proffer).
8. See Proposed Final Judgment and Competitive Impact Statement,
United States v. Adobe Systems, Inc., 75 Fed. Reg. 60820, 60820-01 (Oct. 1, 2010)
(describing the consent decree’s terms).
9. See Proposed Final Judgment, United States v. Adobe Systems, Inc., 75
Fed. Reg. 60820 (Oct. 1, 2010) (“[T]his Final Judgment does not constitute any
admission by the Defendants that the law has been violated . . . .”).
10. See Deslandes v. McDonald’s USA, LLC, No. 17 C 4857, 2018 WL
3105955, at *1 (N.D. Ill. June 25, 2018) (“After a no-hire agreement prevented
plaintiff from obtaining a position with a rival employer, plaintiff . . . filed suit
asserting, among other things, that defendants' no-hire agreement violates the
Sherman Antitrust Act . . . .”).
11. See id. at *3 (describing Deslandes’s time as an employee with
McDonald’s).
12. See id. (describing the facts of the case).
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nearby McDonald’s franchise restaurant, she was told that the
restaurant could not interview her unless she was “released” by
her previous franchise employer.13 This policy originated from
standard provisions within every McDonald’s franchise contract
prohibiting franchise restaurants from poaching employees from
each other.14 However, Deslandes was not released because she
was “too valuable” and she ultimately had to take an entry-level
job with lower pay.15 Unfortunately, Leinani Deslandes’s legal
claim is highly uncertain.16 Given the unique orientation between
franchisor and franchisee in these cases, the courts have struggled
to identify the applicable antitrust standard.17
For the remainder of Part I, this Note will provide an overview
of the antitrust framework as a solution in addition to the history
and development of the current no-poach landscape.18 In Part II,
this Note will outline the steps to proving the first element, the
agreement requirement, of a § 1 claim.19 This will include potential
complications in vertical agreements such as the unilateral action
doctrine, the hub-and-spoke conspiracy, and the intra-enterprise
doctrine.20 In Part III, this Note will then discuss the second
element of a § 1 claim—proving that the restraint at issue is
unreasonable.21 Specifically, this Note will outline the three
standards of review, concluding that per se condemnation is most
13. See id. (demonstrating the effect of the no-poach agreement on the
employee).
14. See id. at *6 (outlining the contractual no-poach agreement provision in
detail).
15. See id. at *9 (stating that Deslandes “had to start over at the bottom
elsewhere” because of the no-poach agreement).
16. See infra Parts I.C–E and accompanying text (describing the agencies’
and federal courts’ experience with no-poach restraints).
17. See infra Part I.E (illustrating the unique difficulties of franchise nopoach restraints).
18. See infra Parts I.C–E and accompanying text (outlining the current state
of no-poach antitrust jurisprudence).
19. See infra Part II and accompanying text (discussing the Sherman Act’s
conspiracy element).
20. See infra Parts II.B–D and accompanying text (describing various
antitrust defenses and complications that arise with vertical restraints).
21. See infra Part III and accompanying text (explaining the second element
of a § 1 violation).
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appropriate while there is a strong argument for quick-look review
in the alternative.22 In Part IV, this Note will discuss the ways an
antitrust plaintiff, after making out a claim, should defend against
a defendant’s pro-competitive justifications.23 Should the plaintiff
meet its initial burden, it is likely that the defendant will not be
able to successfully raise a justification.24
B. Antitrust Law as a Solution: An Overview of § 1 of the
Sherman Act
Antitrust law is not intended to protect social interests beyond
the maintenance of a competitive marketplace.25 However, its
reach is broad enough to protect employees’ rights.26 Antitrust law
was designed to ensure the proper functioning of the markets,
including the labor market.27
Antitrust law addresses employer conspiracies controlling
employment terms precisely because they tamper with the
employment market and thereby impair the opportunities of
those who sell their services there. Just as antitrust law seeks
to preserve the free market opportunities of buyers and sellers
of goods, so also it seeks to do the same for buyers and sellers of
employment services.28
22. See infra Part III and accompanying text (outlining the per se, quicklook, and rule of reason antitrust standards).
23. See infra Part IV and accompanying text (illustrating the requirements
for a successful pro-competitive defense in no-poach cases).
24. See infra Part IV and accompanying text (illustrating the rigorous
requirements for a successful pro-competitive defense in no-poach cases).
25. See Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 695 (1978)
(rejecting the argument that a competitive restraint can be justified by the social
dangers of promoting inferior engineering services).
26. See ANTITRUST DIV., DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST
GUIDANCE FOR HUMAN RESOURCE PROFESSIONALS 1 (2016) [hereinafter HR
GUIDANCE] (describing the importance of an unconstrained labor market for
employees).
27. See id. at 2 (“Just as competition among sellers in an open marketplace
[benefits] consumers . . . competition among employers helps actual and potential
employees through higher wages, better benefits, or other terms of
employment.”).
28. See 2A PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN
ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION ¶352c (4th ed. 2018
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Because no-poach agreements occur in the labor market,
however, they differ from typical restraints of trade between
sellers (firms which sell, distribute, or produce goods or services
for consumers).29 Instead, no-poach agreements impact buyers
(firms which purchase labor from employee sellers).30 However, the
DOJ and Federal Trade Commission (FTC) have an extended
history challenging buy-side restraints on the labor market.31 The
theory is that competition in the labor market provides actual and
potential employees with higher wages, better benefits, and more
varied types of employment—all of which ultimately benefit
consumers because “a more competitive workforce may create
more or better goods and services.”32
In the case of no-poach agreements, the most likely avenue for
antitrust relief would be § 1 of the Sherman Act. Section 1 of the
Sherman Act outlaws every “contract, combination in the form of
trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or
commerce . . . .”33 The law does not reach unilateral acts of
monopolization by individual firms, which are governed by other
antitrust laws such as § 2 of the Sherman Act.34 This distinction,
in fact, can constitute a defense.35 The intra-enterprise doctrine, or
Cum. Supp. 2010-2017) (describing the antitrust law’s application to the labor
market).
29. See id. ¶352a (“Employees may challenge antitrust violations that are
premised on restraining the employment market . . . Standing for employees thus
parallels that for ‘suppliers’ generally[.]”)
30. See id. (describing the employment market as a supply side market).
31. See generally Council of Fashion Designers of Am., 120 F.T.C. 817, 819
(1995) (bringing an FTC enforcement action against a trade association for
agreeing to suppress the wages of fashion models); In re Debes Corp., 115 F.T.C.
701, 704 (1992) (initiating an FTC enforcement action against nursing homes for
boycotting a nurse registry requesting increased wages); Complaint at ¶ 19,
United States v. Utah Soc’y for Healthcare Human Res. Admin., No. 94C282G,
1994 WL 16460700 (D. Utah Mar. 14, 1994) (alleging an agreement between
hospitals to share employment and budget information in order to suppress nurse
wages).
32. See HR GUIDANCE, supra note 26, at 2 (describing the pro-competitive
effects of an unconstrained labor market).
33. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2018).
34. See id. § 2 (targeting unilateral conduct rather than conspiracies to
restrain trade).
35. See infra Part II.D and accompanying text (describing the Copperweld
defense).
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Copperweld doctrine, recognizes the circumstance that two firms
may operate so closely that their decisions are essentially
unilateral, rendering them incapable of conspiring under § 1.36
The first element in a § 1 analysis is a horizontal, vertical, or
“hub and spoke” conspiracy between two or more parties.37 A
horizontal conspiracy is an agreement between competing firms,
while a vertical conspiracy is an agreement between firms
operating at different levels of the supply chain—such as a
manufacturer and retailer.38 A hub-and-spoke conspiracy
combines these elements; it is found where a “hub” orchestrates a
series of vertical agreements, with distributors for example
(“spokes”), in order to facilitate a larger horizontal conspiracy
among the competing distributors (“the rim”).39
The second element of a § 1 violation is a “restraint of trade.”40
However, the Sherman Act has never been read literally; it
condemns only unreasonable restraints of trade.41 The primary
mode for determining the “reasonableness” of a restraint is the rule
of reason; in this analysis, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the
restraint is anticompetitive.42 However, the courts have also
fashioned per se rules for certain offenses (usually horizontal
restraints) that are universally understood to be anticompetitive.43
If a plaintiff demonstrates a per se violation, there is no need to

36. See infra Part II.D and accompanying text (describing the Copperweld
defense).
37. See § 1 (outlawing every “contract, combination in the form of trust or
otherwise, or conspiracy . . . .”).
38. See Toys “R” Us, Inc. v. FTC, 221 F.3d 928, 930 (7th Cir. 2000) (describing
horizontal and vertical agreements).
39. See id. at 934–36 (finding the existence of a hub-and-spoke conspiracy
where vertical agreements facilitated a per se unlawful, horizontal agreement
among Toys “R” Us’ distributors).
40. See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2018) (noting the statutory language of the Sherman
Act).
41. See, e.g., Texaco, Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 5 (2006) (discussing a
divergence between the literal text of the Sherman Act and its treatment by
federal courts).
42. See id. (describing the administration of the rule of reason).
43. See id. (“Per se liability is reserved only for those agreements that ‘are
so plainly anticompetitive that no elaborate study of the industry is needed to
establish their illegality.’” (quoting Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States,
435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978))).
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show anticompetitive effects.44 Pro-competitive effects can only
then be asserted as a justification in certain limited instances.45 As
a result, per se or rule of reason treatment can have a dramatic
effect on the plaintiff’s burden-and the outcome of a case.
There is also a third, intermediate standard which falls in the
middle of the spectrum between the rule of reason and per se
standard.46 A rule of reason analysis may be truncated upon a
“quick look” in circumstances in which a layperson with a
rudimentary understanding of economics would recognize the
anticompetitive effects of the restraint.47 The practical effect of
this analysis—which will be important if the per se rule is not
applied to no-poach agreements—is that the plaintiff is not
required to put forth detailed evidence of anticompetitive effects
through a demonstration of market power.48
If a plaintiff can meet his or her burden under one of the three
modes of analysis, the burden shifts to the defendant.49 Under all
of these modes, including the per se rule, the defendant can still
argue that these restraints are not “naked” anticompetitive
restraints but are “ancillary” to pro-competitive activities.50 If the
defendant successfully makes a justification argument, the burden
shifts back to the plaintiff to show that these efficiencies could
have been achieved by less restrictive means.51 The plaintiff can
44. See Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 723 (1988)
(“Certain categories of agreements, however, have been held to be per se illegal,
dispensing with the need for case-by-case evaluation.”).
45. See infra Part IV and accompanying text (describing the ancillary
restraint doctrine’s requirements in asserting a pro-competitive efficiencies).
46. See Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 770 (1999) (describing “what
has come to be called abbreviated or ‘quick-look’ analysis under the rule of reason
. . .”).
47. See id. (describing when a quick-look analysis would be appropriate).
48. See, e.g., NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 109 (stating that as a
matter of law, the “absence of proof of market power does not justify a naked
restriction on price or output” under a quick look analysis).
49. See Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2284 (2018) (“If the plaintiff
carries its burden, then the burden shifts to the defendant to show a
procompetitive rational for the restraint.”).
50. See Polk Bros., Inc. v. Forest City Enters., 776 F.2d 185, 188–89 (7th Cir.
1985) (discerning naked and ancillary restraints).
51. See Am. Express, 138 S. Ct. at 2284 (outlining the rule of reason burdenshifting test).
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also rebut the defendant’s justification argument by showing that
the harms outweigh potential efficiencies.52 Additionally, the
justifications a defendant can put forward are limited; they must
promote an integrative venture, serve a pro-competitive purpose,
and be commensurate or necessary to achieve the intended
efficiencies.53
C. The DOJ and FTC’s Application of Antitrust Principles to
No-Poach Agreements
1. The Agencies Publicize Their Intent to Criminalize No-Poach
Agreements, Stating That They Constitute Per Se Unlawful
Market Allocations
In October 2016, the Antitrust Division of the DOJ and the
FTC issued “Antitrust Guidance for Human Resource
Professionals” to call attention to no-poach agreements.54 The
agencies announced their intent to proceed criminally against
these agreements because “[they] eliminate competition in the
same irredeemable way as agreements to fix product prices or
allocate customers, which have traditionally been criminally
investigated and prosecuted as hardcore cartel conduct.”55
Specifically, the agencies view this conduct as “a type of allocation
agreement affecting a labor market” where employers allocate the
market of employees between themselves.56 Market allocation
52. See id. at 2291 (“[If the defendant successfully bears this burden, the
antitrust plaintiff may still carry the day by showing . . . that the legitimate
objective does not outweigh the harm that competition will suffer, i.e., that the
agreement “on balance” remains unreasonable.”).
53. See infra Part IV and accompanying text (describing the limitations in
asserting pro-competitive efficiencies).
54. See HR GUIDANCE, supra note 26, at 4 (“Agreements among employers
not to recruit certain employees or not to compete on terms of compensation are
illegal.”).
55. HR GUIDANCE, supra note 26, at 4 (describing the comparable
anticompetitive harms created by no-poach agreements and market allocation
agreements).
56. See Statement of Interest of the United States at 1, In re Ry. Indus. Emp.
No-Poach Antitrust Litig., No. 2:18-MC-00798-JFC (W.D. Pa. Feb. 8, 2019)
[hereinafter Statement of Interest Ry. Indus. Emp.] (describing the United States’
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restraints have been held, time and time again, by the Supreme
Court, to be per se unlawful.57 As a result, the agencies correctly
view no-poach agreements as per se unlawful market allocation
agreements unless they are necessary in facilitating a
pro-competitive venture.58
The practical effect when companies “agree not to hire or
recruit one another’s employees [is that] they are agreeing not to
compete for those employees’ labor.”59 Yet, employees’ negotiating
power often depends on the existence of competing offers of
employment.60 A successful no-poach agreement restricts this
competitive information; in turn, employees cannot measure the
value of their services in the market against competing offers or
employers in order to seek better terms of employment.61 All
conspiring employers then benefit from the depressed price of
labor.62 The employees are left in the cold and the dark, despite the
fact that they never agreed to a non-compete covenant agreement

position on whether the per se rule should be applied to no-poach agreements).
57. See Palmer v. BRG of Ga., Inc., 498 U.S. 46, 49–50 (1990) (per curiam)
(discussing several Supreme Court decisions which found market allocation
restraints illegal).
58. See Statement of Interest Ry. Indus. Emp., supra note 56, at 1–2
(explaining the Department of Justice’s position on the legality of no-poach
agreements).
59. See No-Poach Approach: Division Update Spring 2019, ANTITRUST DIV.,
U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., https://www.justice.gov/atr/division-operations/divisionupdate-spring-2019/no-poach-approach (last updated Sept. 30, 2019) (last visited
Nov. 2, 2019) (discussing the Department of Justice’s recent actions against
employers who participate in no-poach agreements) [https://perma.cc/925DDFJ3].
60. See id. (“Robbing employees of labor market competition deprives them
of job opportunities, information, and the ability to use competing offers to
negotiate better terms of employment.”).
61. See Statement of Interest Ry. Indus. Emp., supra note 56, at 8 (“As with
other types of allocation agreements, an employee that is victim of an allocation
agreement . . . among employers cannot reap the benefits of competition among
those employers that may result in higher wages or better terms of
employment.”).
62. See Statement of Interest Ry. Indus. Emp., supra note 56, at 8
(explaining that no-poach agreements “enable employers to avoid competing over
wages and other terms of employment offered to the affected employees.”).
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with their employer (which would at least be more limited in its
duration and scope).63
Further, the agencies recognized the horizontal nature of
these agreements, stating that the effect of these restraints on the
labor market is the same “regardless of whether the [conspiring]
firms make the same products or . . . services.”64 In other words,
firms may be horizontally aligned (as competitors for certain
employees) in the labor market regardless of whether they are
competitors in their downstream markets for goods and services.65
2. The Agencies Have Been Successful Applying This Theory in
Enforcement Actions
All of the agencies’ enforcement actions to date have dealt with
purely horizontal agreements.66 In other words, the defendants
were firms who not only competed for the same employees but who
also competed in the same downstream sellers’ market for goods
and services.67 For example, the agencies’ experience with
no-poach agreements originated from the three DOJ enforcement
actions against Silicon Valley technology companies discussed
above.68 Additionally, the Antitrust Division has more recently
63. See infra Part IV.B and accompanying text (noting that a justified
restraint must be limited in its scope and duration).
64. Statement of Interest Ry. Indus. Emp., supra note 56, at 7.
65. See Statement of Interest Ry. Indus. Emp., supra note 56, at 7 (focusing
on labor as the relevant market for a no-poach analysis, as opposed to downstream
effects on consumers).
66. See infra Part I.C and accompanying text (describing the federal
government’s experience with no-poach enforcement actions).
67. See, e.g., Competitive Impact Statement at 2–3, United States v.
Knorr-Bremse AG, No. 1:18-cv-00747-CKK (D.D.C. Apr. 3, 2018) [hereinafter
Knorr-Bremse Competitive Impact Statement] (discussing an agreement between
manufacturers of railway equipment); Complaint at *1–2, United States v. eBay,
Inc., No. 5:1212-cv-05869-PSGPSG, 2012 WL 5727488 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 16, 2012)
[hereinafter eBay Complaint] (alleging no-poach agreement between tech firms);
Complaint at *1, United States v. Lucasfilm, Ltd., No. 1:10-cv-02220, 2010 WL
5344347 (D.D.C. Dec. 21, 2010) [hereinafter Lucasfilm Complaint] (classifying the
defendants as “digital animation studios”); Complaint at *1, United States v.
Adobe Sys., Inc., No. 1:10-cv-01629-RBW, 2010 WL 11417874 (D.D.C. Sept. 24,
2010) [hereinafter Adobe Complaint] (identifying defendants as high-tech firms).
68. See supra notes 1–6 and accompanying text (describing the government’s
early initial experience with a no-poach claim).
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reiterated its position in a case involving rail component
competitors Knorr-Bremse AG and Westinghouse Air Brake
Technologies Corp. (Wabtec).69 Notably, the parties consented to a
judgment that enjoined the defendants from engaging in further
no-poach agreements and required them to submit any evidence of
additional no-poach agreements with other companies.70
The FTC also recently brought an FTC Act, Section 5 claim
against competing home-care staffing agencies in the matter of
Your Therapy Source and entered a consent decree in July 2018.71
In this case, the agreement was not technically a no-poach
agreement but a wage-fixing agreement; respondents exchanged
“pay rate information with each other and jointly agreed to lower
therapist pay rates to the same level.”72 The effect was the same,
however; the defendants agreed not to compete in the labor market
“in an attempt to prevent therapists from switching to competing
staffing companies paying higher rates.”73
To date, the agencies have not prosecuted a no-poach claim
with vertical elements.74 A vertical element would present trickier
questions of law.75 First, it would test the agencies’ position that
agreements between vertically oriented firms nonetheless
constitute horizontal agreements between competitors in the labor

69. See Knorr-Bremse Competitive Impact Statement, supra note 67, at *88
(reiterating the view that no-poach agreements are per se unlawful horizontal
labor market allocation agreements—unless they are reasonably necessary to a
separate, legitimate collaboration or transaction).
70. See Final Judgment at *1–2, United States v. Knorr-Bremse AG, No.
1:18-cv-00747, 2018 WL 4386565 CKK (D.D.C. July 11, 2018) (describing the
agreed-upon terms between the parties).
71. See Analysis of Agreement Containing Consent Order to Aid Public
Comment at *2, In re Your Therapy Source, LLC, No. 171-0134, 2018 WL 3769237
(F.T.C. July 31, 2018) (explaining the terms of the consent agreement).
72. See id. at *1 (stating that the alleged behavior violated Section 5 of the
FTC Act, depriving therapists of the benefits of competition by coordinating
wages).
73. See Complaint at 3, In re Your Therapy Source, LLC, No. 171-0134, 2018
WL 3769237 (F.T.C. July 31, 2018) (alleging the nature of the Respondents’
conduct).
74. See infra Part I.C and accompanying text (describing the government’s
experience with no-poach restraints).
75. See infra notes 76–79 and accompanying text.
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market.76 And because the more permissive rule of reason typically
applies to vertical agreements, this distinction is important.77
Additionally, the reason that vertical relationships are treated
differently in the law is because of their potential for
pro-competitive efficiencies.78 As a result, no-poach agreements
with vertical elements are more likely to present potential
justification arguments.79 Despite the agencies’ inaction in the
franchise context, however, private no-poach claims against
franchises have raised these questions.80 In doing so, they raised
the public’s attention and invoked a response from the Front Office
of the Department of Justice.81
D. Federal Courts Grapple with Private No-Poach Franchise
Claims
Attorneys General of ten states and the District of Columbia
announced in 2018 that they were investigating contractual
no-hire provisions in fast-food franchise agreements.82 Shortly
thereafter, seven fast-food chains agreed to remove these
provisions from their franchise agreements or not to enforce
them.83 However, a number of franchise employees have filed class
action complaints against franchisors and franchisees.84
76. See infra Part I.C.1 and accompanying text (laying out the government’s
theory concerning no-poach restraints).
77. See, e.g., Leegin Creative Leather Prods. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 888
(2007) (noting that the antitrust laws treat vertical and horizontal agreements
differently).
78. See id. at 894 (arguing against the use of a per se analysis for vertical
restraints because they often create market efficiencies).
79. See id. (describing the potential efficiencies of vertical restraints).
80. See infra notes 82–95 and accompanying text (describing private nopoach claims).
81. See infra Part I.E (noting the government’s response to the issues raised
in recent private no-poach claims).
82. See Anthony Noto, New York AG Joins Coalition to go After Fast-Food
Franchisors,
NEW YORK BUS. J.
(July
9,
2018,
1:17
PM),
https://www.bizjournals.com/newyork/news/2018/07/09/new-york-ag-joinscoalition-to-go-after-fast-food.html (last visited Nov. 2, 2019) (listing the chains
that
have
no-poach
provisions
in
their
franchise
contracts)
[https://perma.cc/N8PG-LKMH].
83. See id. (noting the effect of the Attorneys Generals’ announcements).
84. See, e.g., Class Action Complaint ¶ 1, Deslandes v. McDonald’s USA,
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Additionally, Senators Cory Booker and Elizabeth Warren
introduced the End Employer Collusion Act, a bill that includes
prohibitions on no-poach agreements, particularly those between
franchisors and franchisees.85 Senators Booker and Warren also
sent a letter to then-Attorney General Jeff Sessions, asking for
additional guidance on the treatment of franchise no-poach
agreements.86
Although Sessions did not respond, three district court judges
have denied defendants’ motions to dismiss in franchise no-poach
cases against Jimmy John’s, McDonalds, and Cinnabon.87 Each
court recognized that no-poach provisions in franchise contracts
are vertical agreements that may have horizontal elements as
well.88 Two of these courts remained open to applying the per se
standard of review if the plaintiff could show a horizontal
relationship among franchisees.89 Additionally, two courts
LLC, No. 1:17-cv-04857, 2017 WL 2804891 (N.D. Ill. June 28, 2017) (alleging that
“franchisees agreed not to recruit or hire each other's employees or employees of
McDonald's or its affiliates”); Class Action Complaint ¶ 1, Ion v. Pizza Hut, LLC,
No. 4:17-cv-00788, 2017 WL 5078431 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 3, 2017) (alleging a
no-solicitation and no-hire agreement among the defendants); Class Action
Complaint ¶ 1, Butler v. Jimmy John’s Franchise, LLC, No. 3:18-cv-00133 , 2018
WL 565099565099 (S.D. Ill. Jan. 24, 2018) (alleging that franchisees “agreed not
to solicit, recruit, or hire each other's employees”).
85. See End Employer Collusion Act, S. 2215, 116th Cong. (2019) (asking
that employers amend their franchise agreements by removing restrictive
employment provisions).
86. See Letter from Cory A. Booker & Elizabeth Warren, Members, U.S.
Senate, to Jefferson Beauregard Sessions III, Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice
(Nov. 21, 2017) (“Despite this clear guidance, no-poach agreements continue to
proliferate in franchise agreements, even though many franchise companies claim
that they are not joint employers regarding their franchisees.”).
87. See Yi v. SK Bakeries, LLC, 2018 No. 18 5627 RJB, 2018 WL 8918587,
at *1 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 13, 2018); Butler v. Jimmy John’s Franchise, LLC, 331
F. Supp. 3d 786, 797 (S.D. Ill. July 31, 2018); Deslandes v. McDonald’s USA, LLC,
No. 17 C 4857, 2018 WL 3105955, at *8 (N.D. Ill. June 25, 2018).
88. See Yi, 2018 WL 8918587, at *4 (discussing vertical and horizontal
elements in the agreements not to solicit or hire Cinnabon employees); Butler,
331 F. Supp. 3d at 795 (recognizing vertical elements but stating that the “effects
are felt strictly at the horizontal level”); Deslandes, 2018 WL 3105955, at * 6
(stating that “the agreement was spearheaded by an entity at the top of the
chain”).
89. See Butler, 331 F. Supp. 3d at 792–93 (stating that the plaintiff must
first distinguish whether the restraint constitutes a vertical or horizontal
restraint subject to per se condemnation); Deslandes, 2018 WL 3105955, at * 5–
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contemplated the intra-enterprise doctrine,90 with one noting that
this conclusion would depend on the evidence uncovered during
discovery.91 One court also recognized the potential for a per se
violation to be shown via a hub-and-spoke conspiracy.92
Additionally, all of the courts recognized the potential applicability
of the abbreviated rule of reason or “quick-look” standard (an
intermediate level of review between per se and extended rule of
reason review).93 Finally, while the courts recognized potential
ancillary justifications,94 one court in particular expressed doubt
that these would be viable.95
6 (noting that per se treatment may apply in the absence of an ancillary
pro-competitive justification).
90. See Yi, 2018 WL 8918587, at *33 (“[A]greements made within a firm can
constitute concerted action covered by § 1 when the parties to the agreement act
on interests separate from those of the firm itself—here competing for labor with
Cinnabon and the other franchisees.”); Butler, 331 F. Supp. 3d at 797 (noting that
the plaintiff plausibly stated a claim but that the analysis may depend on how
independent the franchisees were in relation to the franchisor with respect to the
intra-enterprise doctrine).
91. See Butler, 331 F. Supp. 3d at 797 (“[If] the evidence of franchisee
independence is weak, or if Jimmy John’s carries its burden under the quick look
approach, then the rule of reason may rear its head and burn this case to the
ground.”).
92. See id. at 795 (noting that the claimant plausibly stated a hub-and-spoke
conspiracy where “the ‘hub’ firm enters into a collection of vertical agreements
with other firms—the ‘spokes’—and those spokes then enter into a collection of
horizontal agreements that make up the ‘wheel’”).
93. See Yi v. SK Bakeries, LLC, No. 18-5627 RJB, 2018 WL 8918587, at *4
(W.D. Wash. Nov. 13, 2018) (noting that the plaintiff plausibly alleged
anticompetitive effects under the quick look standard but that the defendant
raised plausible pro-competitive arguments, invalidating a per se standard of
review); Butler v. Jimmy John’s Franchise, LLC, 331 F. Supp. 3d 786, 797 (S.D.
Ill. July 31, 2018) (failing to reach a conclusion about the standard of review but
remaining open to per se, quick look, and rule of reason analysis while noting that
quick look was most likely to apply); Deslandes v. McDonald’s USA, LLC, No. 17
C 4857, 2018 WL 3105955, at *7 (N.D. Ill. June 25, 2018) (recognizing the
possibility that the restraint was potentially ancillary to a pro-competitive
collaboration between franchisor and franchisee, subjecting to “some form” of rule
of reason analysis such as quick look analysis).
94. See Yi, 2018 WL 8918587, at*4 (stating that “it is not clear that the
Defendants' agreements lack any redeeming virtue”); Butler, 331 F. Supp. 3d at
797 (recognizing that the agreements may have procompetitive intrabrand
benefits); Deslandes, 2018 WL 3105955, at *7 (“Each time McDonald’s entered a
franchise agreement, it increased output of burgers and fries, which is to say the
agreement was output enhancing and thus procompetitive.”).
95. See Deslandes, 2018 WL 3105955, at *7–9 (“In this case, plaintiff has
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In Ms. Deslandes’s claim against McDonald’s, Judge Alonso
explained the potential issues facing a franchise defendant who
raises a pro-competitive justification that the provision promotes
interbrand competition (between separate restaurant chains).96 He
stated that “the very fact that McDonald’s has managed to
continue signing franchise agreements even after it stopped
including the provision in 2017 suggests that the no-hire provision
was not necessary to encourage franchisees to sign.”97 Importantly,
he noted that McDonald’s justification argument is grounded in
the conclusion that the relevant antitrust market is the market for
hamburgers rather than employees.98 He disagreed with this
theory, stating that “[t]his case . . . is not about competition for the
sale of hamburgers to consumers. It is about competition for
employees, and, in the market for employees, the McDonald’s
franchisees and McOpCos within a locale are direct, horizontal,
competitors.”99 He concludes that:
A way to promote intrabrand competition for employees would
be an advertising campaign extolling the virtues of working for
McDonald’s. That is not what defendants are alleged to have
done here. Here, they are alleged to have divided the market for
employees by prohibiting restaurants from hiring each other’s
current or former (for the prior six months, anyway) employees.
In the employment market, the various McDonald’s stores are
competing brands. Dividing the market does not promote
intrabrand competition for employees, it stifles interbrand

alleged a horizontal restraint that is ancillary to franchise agreements for
McDonald’s restaurants . . .That is not to say that the provision itself was output
enhancing.”).
96. See Deslandes, 2018 WL 3105955, at *7–8 (describing the issues with
asserting a procompetitive justification).
97. Id. at *7.
98. See id. at *8
It makes sense for McDonald’s franchisees and the McOpCos to
cooperate to promote intrabrand competition for hamburgers, because
a customer who is satisfied with a hamburger she buys today at the
McDonald’s at 111 W. Jackson might tomorrow prefer a hamburger
from the McDonald’s at 233 W. Jackson to a hamburger from Burger
King.
99. See id. (clarifying the relevant antitrust market as the labor market).
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competition.100

E. DOJ Officials Respond, Expressing Reluctance to Apply the
Theory to Vertical Entities
Beginning in 2019, the Department of Justice began to make
the unusual move of issuing statements of interest in private
lawsuits.101 Also unusual was the fact that these statements were
signed by President Trump’s appointed Assistant Attorney,
General Makan Delrahim, and other Front Office officials.102
Several of these statements of interest simply restate the agency’s
position that no-poach agreements are per se illegal in the absence
of a pro-competitive collaboration.103 These were written in
response to cases in which the parties are competitors.104
For example, one of the DOJ’s recently filed statements of
interest was in Seaman v. Duke University,105 a private action
alleging that Duke University and the University of North
Carolina agreed not to solicit each other’s medical school faculty.106
In this statement, the DOJ reiterated its opinion that no-poach
agreements are simply a variant of a per se illegal market
allocation and should be condemned under existing law.107
Further, it stated that Duke’s arguments that the restraints were

100. Id.
101. See Corrected Statement of Interest of the United States at i, Harris v.
CJ Star, LLC, No. 2:18-cv-00247-SAB (E.D. Wash. Mar. 8, 2019) [hereinafter
Harris] (providing an example of a DOJ statement of interest in a private
lawsuit); Statement of Interest of the United States at i, Seaman v. Duke Univ.,
No. 1:15-cv-462 (M.D.N.C. Mar. 7, 2019) [hereinafter Seaman] (same).
102. See, e.g., Harris, supra note 101 at 18 (naming the Assistant Attorney
General, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, and Chief of Staff and General
Counsel, in addition to attorneys from the Antitrust Division).
103. See Harris, supra note 101, at 10 (comparing the effects of no-poach and
wage-fixing agreements).
104. See, e.g., infra notes 105–110 and accompanying text (describing a nopoach agreement between competing universities).
105. Seaman, supra 101.
106. See Seaman, supra 101, at 3 (discussing the facts of the underlying
litigation).
107. See Seaman, supra 101, at 5 (stating that the no-poach agreement is a
form of agreed market-allocation).
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ancillary to a pro-competitive justification should be rejected.108
The defendants’ justifications were not related to any legitimate
integration between the universities and, as a result, they could
not argue that the conduct was necessary to promote this
venture.109 Notably, within this statement, the DOJ referred to the
fact that its position in this case with horizontal competitors would
differ in the franchise context.110
Rather than filing its own litigation, the DOJ filed statements
of interest in class action lawsuits against Carl’s Jr., Auntie
Anne’s, and Arby’s—clarifying that no-poach agreements between
a franchisor and franchisee typically merit rule of reason analysis,
that quick-look analysis should not apply, and that the franchise
model does not necessarily constitute a hub-and-spoke
conspiracy.”111 The timing of these statements of interests
indicates that they are a response to the district courts’ conclusions
in private no-poach actions.112 The statements could indicate a
reluctance to create law that could constrain vertical agreements,
which more conservative antitrust theorists have traditionally
presumed to be output-enhancing.113 In addition to examining the
antitrust analysis for no-poach agreements through a wider lens,
this Note will weigh these conclusions in the franchise context.
108. See Seaman, supra note 101, at 28–29 (“Duke also wrongly argues that
the rule of reason must apply because ‘the schools collaborate and support each
other’ and a no-poach agreement could help prevent ‘free riding’ on their
investment in medical faculty.”).
109. See Seaman, supra note 101, at 29 (stating that Duke did not identify
any specific procompetitive collaborations with its competitor).
110. See Seaman, supra note 101, at 26–27 (“Moreover, both Yi and Deslandes
involve no-poach provisions in franchise agreements, which are quite different
from the naked no-poach agreement between competitors alleged here.”).
111. See generally Harris, supra note 101; Statement of Interest of the United
States, Richmond v. Bergey Pullman Inc., No. 2:18-cv-00246 (E.D. Wash. Mar. 8,
2019) [hereinafter Richmond]; Corrected Statement of Interest of the United
States, Stigar v. Dough Dough, Inc., No. 2:18-cv-00244-SAB (E.D. Wash. Mar. 8,
2019) [hereinafter Stigar].
112. Compare supra Part I.C, with supra note 111 and accompanying text
(detailing the existing private franchise no-poach cases and accompanying
statements of interests).
113. See ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 291 (1978) (“We have seen
that vertical price fixing (resale price maintenance), vertical market division
(closed dealer territories), and, indeed, all vertical restraints are beneficial to
consumers and should for that reason be completely lawful.”).
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II. Element 1: Proving an Agreement

A. Agreements Are Shown by Evidence of Express Agreement or
by “Plus Factors”
In the cases brought by the Antitrust Division, the agreements
were evidenced by email communications describing hiring
policies, internal approvals of employees to be hired from
conspiring firms, direct and explicit communications to enforce the
no-poach agreement, evidence of senior executives negotiating the
agreements, and in some cases, written contracts.114 Although the
high-tech antitrust actions brought by the Antitrust Division were
settled, a court adjudicating a follow-on class action assessed the
sufficiency of the evidence of a conspiracy in this case.115 The
district court in the Ninth Circuit found that there was ample
evidence to support the existence of an agreement; direct
communications in addition to circumstantial evidence including
substantially identical agreements between the tech companies
and company-wide enforcement of the contracts by senior
executives.116 Tellingly, after this proceeding, the companies also
reached a settlement.117
The Ninth Circuit’s conclusion is in line with existing antitrust
principles.118 First, a court examining a no-poach agreement would
114. See Knorr-Bremse Competitive Impact Statement, supra note 67, at 2–3
(describing email communications between the defendants’ senior executives); In
re High-Tech Emp. Antitrust Litig., 856 F. Supp. 2d 1103, 1112 (N.D. Cal. 2012)
(“Apple and Adobe reached the agreement through direct and explicit
communications between their senior executives, who actively managed and
enforced the agreement through further direct communications.”);
eBay
Complaint, supra note 67, at 5 (alleging in-person meetings between senior
managers of the defendant firms); Adobe Complaint, supra note 67 (alleging
“direct and explicit communications” between senior executives of the named
defendants); Lucasfilm Complaint, supra note 67, at 4 (alleging that Pixar
executives drafted written terms and supplied them to Lucasfilm).
115. See In re High-Tech Emp. Antitrust Litig., 856 F. Supp. 2d 1103, 1115–
23 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (assessing the plausibility of a conspiracy in light of the
evidence).
116. See id. at 1116–18 (weighing the plausibility of an unlawful agreement
on the basis of the plaintiffs’ factual allegations).
117. See Settlement Agreement, In re High-Tech Emp. Antitrust Litig., No.
5:11CV02509, 2013 WL 8480300 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 21, 2013) (resolving the dispute).
118. See infra notes 119–122 and accompanying text (describing the antitrust
analysis for the conspiracy element of a § 1 claim).
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consider direct evidence including documents, meetings, and
testimony that “defendants exchanged commitments or
collaborated by some means other than making a market place
decision.”119 Circumstantial evidence is also considered, especially
where direct evidence is insufficient.120 If evidence of an express
agreement does not exist, the court will also consider whether the
parallel behavior (i.e. no-poaching conduct) is likely to be caused
by an agreement rather than natural market forces.121 If
interdependence between the firms seems likely, the court must
weigh all of the evidence to decide whether the possibility of
conspiracy is more probable than not.122
1. Proving a Conspiracy by Evidence of an Express Agreement
Although direct evidence of an express agreement is often
decisive, it is not commonly found.123 However, in the actions
brought by the Antitrust Division, direct and circumstantial
evidence of an express agreement were available; the reason for
this may be that some form of communication is often necessary in
a very practical sense in order to effectuate and enforce
no-poaching agreements.124 Nonetheless, in the case that
119. See 6 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 28, § 1410, at 60 (2d ed. 2003)
(describing the question of whether the behavior was concerted or had another
plausible explanation based on competitive market conditions).
120. See 6 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 28, § 1410, at 60 (2d ed. 2003)
(explaining the process a court should follow when weighing evidence of a
conspiracy in antitrust litigation).
121. See 6 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 28, § 1410, at 60 (2d ed. 2003)
(describing the question of whether the behavior was concerted or has another
plausible explanation based on competitive market conditions).
122. See 6 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 28, § 1410, at 60 (2d ed. 2003)
(explaining the steps a court should take in weighing evidence of conspiracy in
antitrust litigation).
123. See 6 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 28, § 1410, at 60 (2d ed. 2003)
(recognizing the clandestine nature of conspiracies).
124. See Complaint at 2, United States v. Knorr-Bremse AG, No.
1:18-cv-00747, 2018 WL 4386565 (D.D.C. Apr. 3, 2018) (prosecuting naked
no-poach agreements in which direct evidence of a contract between competitors
or internal communications documenting an agreement were available); see also
Adobe Complaint, supra note 67 (same); Lucasfilm Complaint, supra note 67, at
*2 (same); eBay Complaint, supra note 67, at *2 (same).
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conspirators are careful not to discuss no-poaching agreements
over email or other easily documented forms of communications,
this is not the only way to uncover evidence of an express
agreement.125
Evidence of an express agreement may range from a meeting
of minds sufficient to form an enforceable contract to the
ambiguous situation where parties refuse to utter words of
acceptance after requesting common action.126 The line drawn for
when communications become a conspiracy is not a clear one and
is usually an issue for the trier of fact.127 However, the Supreme
Court’s approach in United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co.128
illustrates the theoretical underpinnings of this inquiry.129 In this
case, the defendants formed an informal “gentlemen’s agreement”
where each major oil company would purchase an unspecified
quantity of excess distress oil from specified suppliers (or “dancing
partners”) to exploit gasoline spot markets and extract monopoly
prices.130 The case effectuates the “statutory purpose, for even a
vague understanding between competitors on a common course of
action involves both collective decision-making on future behavior
and some degree of express mutual assurance . . . .”131 And when
this understanding is between competitors, a conspiracy is more
likely to be inferred.132
In the no-poach context, an agreement is the key component
that makes the arrangement beneficial to each party.133 Without
125. See 6 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 28, § 1404 (2d ed. 2003) (stating
that direct communication is not necessary to establish a conspiracy under
Sherman Act § 1).
126. See 6 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 28, § 1404 (2d ed. 2003)
(describing an antitrust conspiracy reduced to its most basic form).
127. See 6 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 28, § 1410 (2d ed. 2003)
(explaining the fact intensive nature of the inquiry).
128. See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 105, 218–20 (1940)
(describing the theoretical approach to finding an antitrust conspiracy).
129. See id. (describing the theoretical factual inquiry that a court must
undergo to find a conspiracy under the Sherman Act).
130. See id. at 177–96 (describing the alleged agreements among gas
companies that amount to an antitrust violation).
131. 6 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 28, § 1404 (2d ed. 2003).
132. See 6 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 28, § 1404 (2d ed. 2003)
(highlighting the increased scrutiny of communications between competitors).
133. See No More No-Poach: The Antitrust Division Continues to Investigate
and Prosecute No-Poach and Wage-Fixing Agreements, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST.,
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an agreement, a company would simply lose its own employees
while halting its recruitment efforts.134 The restraint would not be
effective in the absence of mutual assurances and
collective-decision making.135 As seen in the agencies’ enforcement
actions, this fact seems to make the existence of direct and
circumstantial evidence more likely.136 A company would not be
likely to engage in this practice with just a wink and a nod.137
Further, this practice would need to be communicated and policed
internally.138 If explicit communications between the companies
are not available, evidence of meetings or other potential collective
decision-making behavior between the firms may support an
express agreement.139
2. Inferring a Conspiracy Through “Plus Factors”
Beyond direct and circumstantial evidence of an express
agreement, several other “plus factors” may also help distinguish
an agreement from conscious parallelism.140 The Court in
https://www.justice.gov/atr/division-operations/division-update-spring2018/antitrust-division-continues-investigate-and-prosecute-no-poach-and-wagefixing-agreements (last updated Apr. 10, 2018) (last visited Dec. 7, 2019) (stating
that no-poach agreements are ineffective unless they are of mutual benefit to the
agreeing parties) [https://perma.cc/BE4C-MK5B].
134. See In re Ry. Indus. Emp. No-Poach Antitrust Litig., No. 2850, 2019 WL
2542241, *14–15 (W.D. Pa. June 20, 2019) (describing plausible motivations for
entering into a no-poach agreement).
135. See, e.g., In re Animation Workers Antitrust Litig., 123 F. Supp. 3d 1175,
1181–84 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (describing the factual allegations of a joint antisolicitation scheme where the mutual benefit expressly motivated the parties’
entry into an agreement).
136. See, e.g., id. (describing e-mail correspondence and other facts supporting
the existence of a conspiracy).
137. See 6 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 28, § 1404 (2d ed. 2003)
(describing the level of conduct generally required to find that an agreement
existed).
138. See, e.g., In re High-Tech Emp. Antitrust Litig., 856 F. Supp. 2d 1103,
1110 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (describing the role of senior executives in enforcing the
Silicon Valley no-poach agreements).
139. See 6 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 28, § 1410 (2d ed. 2003)
(describing the factual inquiry for finding a conspiracy in the absence of an
express agreement).
140. See, e.g., In re Chocolate Confectionary Antitrust Litig., 801 F.3d 383,
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Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.141 stated
that conduct “as consistent with permissible competition as with
illegal conspiracy does not, standing alone, support an inference of
antitrust conspiracy . . . a plaintiff . . . must present evidence that
tends to exclude the possibility that the alleged conspirators acted
independently.”142 The Court identified two fact specific inquiries
relevant to this question: first, whether the defendant had a
rational motive to join the conspiracy and second, whether the
conduct is consistent with the defendant’s individual
self-interest.143
In response, courts have devised a series of “plus factors” that
tend to indicate the likelihood of an agreement.144 In accordance
with Matsushita’s two questions, the most important factor is
whether, acting alone, the conduct is contrary to the parties’
economic self-interests but would be beneficial when executed
collectively.145 This factor alone is often sufficient to state a
claim.146 The next most important factor is whether a joint act of
standardization such as a price change occurs (especially in times
360 (3d Cir. 2015) (identifying a non-exhaustive list of “plus factors” to distinguish
conspiracy from conscious parallelism—when companies act similarly due to
independent decision-making based on rational market decisions).
141. See Matsushita Electr. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,
588 (1986) (stating the modern standard for agreement under § 1 of the Sherman
Act).
142. Id.
143. See id. (identifying the two major questions distinguishing agreement
and conscious parallelism).
144. See, e.g., Chocolate Confectionary, 801 F.3d 383 at 398 (identifying a
non-exhaustive list of “plus” factors).
145. See Interstate Cir., Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 222 (1939)
(“[W]ithout substantially unanimous action . . . there was risk of a substantial
loss of business and good will . . . but that with it there was the prospect of
increased profits.”); see also, Theatre Enters. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp.,
346 U.S. 537, 540–42 (1954) (upholding a jury verdict where evidence showed
each party’s self-interest should have led them to refuse the scheme); Intervest,
Inc. v. Bloomberg, L.P., 340 F.3d 144, 165 (3d Cir. 2003); Re/Max Int’l v. Realty
One, 173 F.3d 995, 1009–10 (6th Cir. 1999); Todorov v. DCH Healthcare Auth.,
921 F.2d 1438, 1456 n.30 (11th Cir. 1991); Standard Iron Works v. ArcelorMittal,
639 F. Supp. 2d 877, 896–97 (N.D. Ill. 2009); In re Currency Conversion Fee
Antitrust Litig., 265 F. Supp. 2d 385, 419 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
146. See, e.g., Starr v. Sony Music Entm’t, 592 F.3d 314, 327 (2d Cir. 2010)
(“[P]laintiffs have alleged behavior that would plausibly contravene each
defendant’s self-interest ‘in the absence of similar behavior by rivals.’” (quoting 6
AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 28, § 1415a (2d ed. 2003))).
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where price should move in a contrary manner based on supply
and demand).147 Finally, if the company cannot offer a legitimate
explanation for the action and posits pre-textual justifications, this
further reinforces the likelihood of concerted action.148 Ultimately,
any fact delineating whether the action resulted from an
agreement may constitute a “plus factor”; all of these facts would
be weighed in the aggregate to determine the existence of a
conspiracy.149
A consideration of these core “plus factors” weighs in favor of
condemning no-poach agreements. Facially, a restriction on hiring
which prevents a company from competing for the best employees
is not in an individual company’s self-interest.150 Although a
defendant may argue that it is beneficial for a company to stop
hiring competitor employees in order to prevent the loss of its own
employees, this is not a practice that a company can effectuate on
its own without an agreement—outside of its own internal
retention programs.151 By their very nature, no-poaching

147. See Am. Tobacco v. United States, 328 U.S. 781,805 (1946) (noting the
defendants’ behavior was incongruent with supply and demand); see also
C-O-Two Fire Equip. Co. v. United States, 197 F.2d 489, 497 (9th Cir. 1952)
(same); Haley Paint Co. v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 804 F. Supp. 2d 419,
425–26 (D. Md. 2011) (same); In re Plasma-Derivative Protein Therapies
Antitrust Litig., 764 F. Supp. 2d 991, 999–1001 (N.D. Ill. 2011) (same).
148. See, e.g., Am. Tobacco, 328 U.S. at 805 (noting the analysis of “plus
factors” functions in the aggregate); see also Dimidowich v. Bell & Howell, 803
F.2d 1473, 147–80 (9th Cir. 1986) (same).
149. See, e.g., Cont’l Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690,
698–99 (1962) (“[P]laintiffs should be given the full benefit of their proof without
tightly compartmentalizing the various factual components and wiping the slate
clean after scrutiny of each.”).
150. See, e.g., To Raise Wages, Make Companies Compete for Workers, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 19, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/19/opinion/oregonnoncompete.html (last visited Dec. 2, 2019) (discussing how wages increased in
Oregon after a law was passed making it easier for employees to take positions at
different companies, thus creating a more competitive pool of employees)
[https://perma.cc/4FHB-WHDV].
151. See Michael A. Lindsay, McDonald’s and Medicine: Developments in the
Law of No-Poaching and Wage-Fixing Agreements, 33 A.B.A. ANTITRUST, Spring
2019, at 18 (describing UNC’s retention program put in place to respond to Duke’s
attempts to poach employees).
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agreements require collective conspiratorial action with an
understanding of mutual assurance in a common scheme.152
When companies successfully conspire to restrict hiring, those
employees are then less able to switch or obtain higher wages—
allowing employers to depress wages.153 As a result, evidence of
depressed wages, especially during a shortage of labor, would be
indicative of a conspiracy because this trend would be economically
infeasible.154 Finally, outside of certain justifications discussed in
Part IV of this Note (such as a desire to protect a joint venture’s
progress or to protect intellectual property rights), it will likely be
difficult for a company to provide an alternate explanation for its
refusal to hire certain companies’ employees.155
B. An Additional Challenge in Proving an Agreement Between
Vertical Entities: The Colgate Unilateral Action Doctrine
Although the Supreme Court in Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite
Service Corp.156 established that horizontal and vertical
conspiracies are shown in the same manner, vertical elements
present additional challenges in proving an agreement.157 In this
same decision, the Court revived the Colgate “unilateralism”
doctrine, which allows a firm to announce its pricing policies and
terms of dealing with distributors without soliciting a
conspiracy.158 A firm that complies with the policy is also free from
liability since compliance constitutes its unilateral decision to act

152. See id. (describing the type of collective behavior that could culminate in
a conspiracy).
153. See HR GUIDANCE, supra note 26 (describing the competitive effects of
no-poach agreements).
154. See supra note 148 and accompanying text (describing economically
irrational trends as a significant “plus factor”).
155. See infra Part IV (noting the strict requirements in asserting a
procompetitive justification).
156. See Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 764 (1984)
(explaining the evidentiary standard for showing a plausible conspiracy).
157. See id. (“There must be direct or circumstantial evidence that reasonably
tends to prove . . . a conscious commitment to a common scheme . . . .”).
158. See id. at 762 (describing the limited circumstances that unilateral,
independent decisions by a firm to comply with another’s terms of business do not
form an antitrust conspiracy).
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in its own economic self-interest.159 However, a closer look at the
development of this doctrine reveals that it is a narrow exception
and that no-poach agreements are unlikely to fall within it.160
In United States v. Colgate & Co.,161 the manufacturer
announced a uniform dealer pricing policy and stated that
non-complying dealers would be terminated.162 However, there
was no averment that the parties bound themselves in a common
scheme to maintain prices.163 Colgate simply announced the prices
that it planned to sell its products; it did not meet with dealers in
order to influence their decisions.164 The vendors could, in fact,
receive and give away Colgate’s products; they did not enter a
preemptive agreement forbidding them from selling at other
prices.165 The manufacturer was free to exercise his discretion to
terminate the dealer and the supplier would be able to decide
whether or not to comply—even if the alternative was to face
termination.166 However, the Court made it clear that where
evidence of an agreement exists, Colgate will not otherwise excuse
the conduct.167

159. See id. at 761 (explaining the rationale for the Colgate doctrine).
160. See infra notes 161–194 and accompanying text (discussing the
development of the Colgate doctrine).
161. See United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 303–04 (1919)
(distinguishing a unilateral decision from a conspiracy).
162. See id. (distinguishing a unilateral decision from a conspiracy).
163. See id. at 305 (“The pregnant fact should never be lost sight of that no
averment is made of any contract or agreement having been entered into whereby
the defendant . . . and his customers, bound themselves to enhance and maintain
prices.”).
164. See id. (describing Colgate’s limited contact with its distributors in
forming its independent policy).
165. See id. (noting the limited control exercised by Colgate in terms of its
distributors’ acquiescence).
166. See id. (showing that Colgate product distributors retained their own
independent decision-making processes).
167. See United States v. A. Schrader’s Son, 252 U.S. 85, 98 (1920) (stating
that the contracts at issue were unlike the policy in Colgate where the parties had
failed to show that Colgate “made agreements, either express or implied, which
undertook to obligate vendees to observe specified resale prices.”); see also Frey
& Son v. Cudahy Packing Co., 256 U.S. 208, 212–14 (1921) (stating that the
existence of an agreement should have been decided by the jury rather than being
dismissed under Colgate).
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In later cases, the Supreme Court attempted to further clarify
the point at which unilateral decision-making becomes concerted
action.168 In FTC v. Beech Nut Packing Co.,169 the defendant not
only refused to sell to wholesalers who did not abide by listed retail
prices but also required that they restrict their sales to
sub-retailers who complied with the policy.170 The Supreme Court
held that a manufacturer may refuse to sell to vendors who deviate
from list prices but may not “go beyond the exercise of this right,
and by contracts or combinations, express or implied, unduly
hinder or obstruct the free and natural flow of commerce in the
channels of interstate trade.”171
Forty years later, the Supreme Court in United States v.
Bausch & Lomb Optical Co.172 read Beech-Nut as limiting Colgate
to mere acquiescence in a manufacturer’s published pricing lists.173
The court found that the scheme in Bausch & Lomb was
comparable to that in Beech-Nut in that it went beyond wholesaler
adherence to resale prices by restricting its wholesaler’s customers
as a part of a larger scheme.174 Specifically, Bausch & Lomb agreed
not to sell pink tinted glass or lenses to any of Soft-Lite’s
competitors and not to compete with Soft-Lite in the marketing of
any other pink tinted lens.175 The Court stated that Bausch &
Lomb participated in the distribution scheme by accepting
“Soft-Lite’s proffer of a plan of distribution by cooperating in prices,
limit[ing] sales to and approval of retail licensees. That is
sufficient.”176

168. See infra notes 173–98 (discussing the development of the Colgate
doctrine).
169. See FTC v. Beech-Nut Packing Co., 257 U.S. 441 (1922) (describing the
Beech-Nut policy).
170. See id. at 445 (describing the Beech-Nut policy).
171. See id. at 453 (summarizing Schrader’s Son and Frey & Son).
172. See United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707, 721–23
(1944) (comparing the facts of the case to Beech-Nut).
173. See id. (“As in the Beech-Nut case, there is more here than mere
acquiescence of wholesalers in Sofe-Lite’s published resale price list.”).
174. See id. (stating the rationale for finding an agreement).
175. See id. at 717 (describing the Bausch & Lomb marketing plan).
176. See id. at 721 (citing Interstate Circuit v. United States, 306 U.S. 208,
221 (1939)).
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In United States v. Parke, Davis & Co.,177 the Supreme Court
summarized Beech-Nut and Bausch & Lomb, adding that a proffer
occurs when “a manufacturer is unwilling to rely on individual
self-interest to bring about general voluntary acquiescence . . . and
takes affirmative action to achieve uniform adherence.”178 The
Court in Parke, Davis noted evidence of an express agreement—
consistent with the type of facts outlined in Part II.B to evidence a
horizontal agreement.179 The defendant negotiated directly with
retailers charging less than specified prices, received their
assurances, and used those assurances as well as the complaints
of these retailers to effectuate the scheme.180 In other words,
Parke, Davis did not “rest with the simple announcement to the
trade of its policy . . . [i]t was only by actively bringing about
substantial unanimity among the competitors that Parke, Davis
was able to gain adherence to its policy.”181 In light of these
individual negotiations and meetings, a traditional agreement
could be shown if, after the meeting, the dealer then adhered to
these prices.182
As in Parke, Davis, evidence of an express agreement was also
decisive in Monsanto and illustrates that coercive conduct is a
“plus factor” that is more likely to occur in vertical agreement
cases.183 In this case, Monsanto approached two price-cutting
distributors and advised them that if they did not meet resale price
limits, their supply of herbicide would be cut off.184 When one of
177. See United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29, 44 (1960)
(describing the standards for finding an agreement under Bausch & Lomb Optical
and Beech-Nut).
178. See id. (articulating the importance of independent decision making
when classifying actions as unilateral).
179. See supra Part II.B.1 (describing the analysis to show a conspiracy
through evidence of an express agreement).
180. See Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. at 46 (listing the defendant’s
intervening actions with respect to its distributors and retailers).
181. Id.
182. See id. at 46 n.6 (stating that if the suspended retailer resumed
adherence after the interview with Parke, Davis management, the companies will
have entered into an agreement in violation of the Sherman Act).
183. See Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 764–67
(1984) (describing Monsanto’s scheme).
184. See id. (detailing the retail price maintenance scheme implemented by
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the distributors refused, Monsanto complained to its parent
company and subsequently received assurances of compliance.185
The Supreme Court found that this direct evidence of an
agreement was “plainly relevant and persuasive as to a meeting of
minds.”186
Further, the court considered the timing of Monsanto’s threat
during shipping season when herbicide was in short supply; it
stated that “the jury could have reasonably concluded that
Monsanto sought this agreement at a time when it was able to use
supply as a lever to force compliance.187 Additionally, the court
evaluated a dealer’s letter to its customers, written after a meeting
with Monsanto; the letter stated that the dealer was sure that
Monsanto outlets would maintain a minimum price level and that
Monsanto dictated the “rules of the game.”188 The Court found that
the evidence tended to support the existence of a conspiracy.189
More recent cases also support the inference of an illegal
agreement based on evidence of threats, incentives to comply,
individual negotiations or other actions beyond complaints or fear
of termination.190
Monsanto Co.).
185. See id. (describing Monsanto’s actions with respect to non-compliance
with set prices).
186. See id. (relying on direct evidence to show an agreement).
187. See id. at 765 n.10 (relying additionally on circumstantial evidence to
support the existence of an agreement).
188. See id. (relying additionally on circumstantial evidence to support the
existence of an agreement).
189. See id. (finding that direct and circumstantial evidence of an agreement
supported the jury’s finding and was sufficient because it tended to exclude
independent action).
190. See Miles Distrib. v. Specialty Constr. Brands, 476 F.3d 442, 451–52 (7th
Cir. 2006) (stating that price complaints are insufficient, without more, to
establish vertical agreements); see also InterVest, Inc. v. Bloomberg, L.P., 340
F.3d 144, 150 (3d Cir. 2003) (“InterVest does not present evidence indicating that
Bloomberg was threatened into doing so or that there was an agreement . . . .”);
Viazis v. Am. Ass’n of Orthodontists, 314 F.3d 758, 763–65 (5th Cir. 2002) (stating
that the plaintiff failed to present evidence that defendant threatened the
distributor); Rossi v. Standard Roofing, 156 F.3d 452, 478–79 (3d Cir. 1998)
(finding that evidence of responses to distributor complaints, threats to
non-complying distributors, and monitoring supported the existence of an
agreement); DeLong Equip. Co. v. Wash. Mills Electro Minerals Corp., 990 F.2d
1186, 1194–96 (11th Cir. 1993) (condemning distributor who was given kickbacks
to maintain appearance of equal resale prices).
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To summarize, Beech-Nut, Bausch & Lomb, and Parke, Davis
read Colgate narrowly to find that each company executed
restraints going beyond a unilateral (and purely vertically
oriented) decision to select dealers who would abide by listed resale
prices.191 Each company extended its influence beyond the
selection of its vertically oriented vendors, using the threat of
termination to effectuate a larger scheme that went beyond this
relationship.192 The Colgate doctrine does not shelter this
conduct.193 This type of scheme often accompanies direct evidence
of an agreement which invalidates the defense as well; in Parke,
Davis and Monsanto, the companies needed to communicate
directly with and even pressure its dealers into compliance with
the aim of perpetuating a larger (horizontal) scheme.194
Under this framework, no-poach agreements are unlikely to
be protected by the Colgate doctrine because they are not limited
to terminating vertically oriented partners that fail to abide with
a firm’s sales or distribution policies for its product.195 The intent
of a successful no-poach agreement is to carry out a greater
conspiracy between competing firms in the labor market, even if
those firms are the vertical entities themselves.196 For example, a
conceivable scenario with vertical elements could occur when a
robot component manufacturer (who makes part of a robot) asks
its customer—a robot manufacturer—to stop poaching its tech
employees.197

191. See supra notes 169–190 and accompanying text (summarizing
Beech-Nut, Bausch & Lomb, and Parke, Davis).
192. See supra notes 169–190 and accompanying text (describing Beech-Nut,
Bausch & Lomb, and Parke, Davis).
193. See United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919) (introducing
the theory that announcement and termination constitutes unilateral behavior).
194. See supra notes 169–190 and accompanying text (outlining Beech-Nut,
Bausch & Lomb, and Parke, Davis).
195. See Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. at 307 (introducing the theory that
announcement and termination constitutes unilateral behavior).
196. See, e.g., In re High-Tech Employment Antitrust Litig., 856 F. Supp. 2d
1103, 1111 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (explaining the purpose for entering into a no-poach
agreement with market competitors).
197. See, e.g., Toys “R” Us, Inc. v. FTC, 221 F.3d 928, 930 (7th Cir. 2000)
(describing horizontal and vertical agreements).
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In this scenario, and in the franchise context, the no-poach
restraint is not truly vertical because it has nothing to do with the
joint effort of manufacturing robots or burgers.198 The restraints
extend beyond this vertical relationship and impact their
horizontal relationship in the labor market.199 In other words,
these restraints would condition (vertical) business dealings in the
downstream market on the firms’ behavior with its horizontal
competitors in the labor market.200 No-poach agreements occur in
the same way that Beech-Nut, Bausch & Lomb, Parke, Davis, and
Monsanto used their positions in a vertical downstream market to
condition a larger horizontal restriction among their vendors.201
If the robot manufacturer is dependent on the robot
component manufacturer’s machine parts, it may feel pressured
into accepting the offer.202 Similarly, a franchisee may only be able
to participate in a franchise if it agrees to a contractual no-poach
provision.203 As seen in Monsanto, evidence of an agreement—such
as individual communications followed by the conspirator’s
compliance—would foreclose Colgate protection.204 In a case with
vertical elements, power imbalances between the firms are more
likely to result in this type of coercive conduct.205 Further, it is
unlikely that a company would publicly announce a no-poach
policy and give free rein to partnering companies to decide on their
198. See Deslandes v. McDonald’s USA, LLC, No. 17 C 4857, 2018 WL
3105955, at *8 (N.D. Ill. June 25, 2018) (“This case . . . is not about competition
for the sale of hamburgers to consumers. It is about competition for employees,
and, in the market for employees, the McDonald’s franchisees and McOpCos
within a locale are direct, horizontal, competitors.”).
199. See HR GUIDANCE, supra note 26 (describing the competitive effects of
no-poach agreements).
200. See supra notes 191–194 and accompanying text (summarizing outlier
cases in the Colgate line of cases).
201. See supra notes 191–194 and accompanying text (summarizing outlier
cases in the Colgate line of cases).
202. See, e.g., Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 764–
67 (1984) (describing Monsanto’s conduct with its wholesalers).
203. See, e.g., Deslandes v. McDonald’s USA, LLC, No. 17 C 4857, 2018 WL
3105955, at *6 (N.D. Ill. June 25, 2018) (outlining the contractual no-poach
agreement provision in detail).
204. See Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 764 (describing the evidentiary standard for
showing an agreement).
205. See id. (contrasting a major company such as Monsanto with a family
business like Spray-Rite).
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own whether or not to comply.206 It is much more likely that a
company would have certain key business relationships and would
discuss a no-poaching policy with these firms directly.207 As a
result, the likelihood of evidence of direct collusion would
potentially foreclose Colgate protection as well.208
C. Combining Vertical and Horizontal Elements: Proving a Huband-Spoke Conspiracy
One theory rearing its head in the franchise cases is the
hub-and-spoke conspiracy.209 According to this theory, a plaintiff
can demonstrate a horizontal agreement between competitors who
are connected to a common “hub” through a series of vertical
agreements.210 Successfully proving a “hub-and-spoke” conspiracy
can have a dramatic effect; the Supreme Court has consistently
established that per se rules applicable to horizontal restraints
also apply to these conspiracies.211 The reason is that a
206. See, e.g., In re High-Tech Emp. Antitrust Litig., 856 F. Supp. 2d 1103,
1119 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (noting an e-mail that demonstrated the understanding
that an agreement was necessary to make internal no-poach policies effective).
207. See, e.g., id. (describing the various business relationships Steve Jobs
leveraged to garner widespread participation in a non-solicitation scheme).
208. See supra note 195–208 and accompanying text (explaining the Colgate
framework).
209. See infra notes 210–212 and accompanying text (discussing the hub-andspoke theory).
210. See Toys “R” Us v. FTC, 221 F.3d 928, 930 (7th Cir. 2000) (describing
horizontal and vertical agreements, finding that the agreement at issue was a
hub-and-spoke conspiracy).
211. See, e.g., Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208 (1939)
(inferring a per se illegal horizontal conspiracy where the agreement only
benefitted competitors if they each agree to similar terms with the ‘hub’—who
facilitates and assures this compliance); see also United States v. Masonite Corp.,
316 U.S. 265 (1942) (reaffirming the Interstate Circuit inference standard);
United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29, 46 (1960) (stating that Parke,
Davis’ conduct was not covered by the Colgate unilateral action doctrine and a
horizontal conspiracy was formed when it “sought assurances of compliance and
got them, as well as the compliance itself.”); United States v. Gen. Motors Corp.,
384 U.S. 127, 143 (1966) (inferring a horizontal conspiracy when “[t]he dealers
collaborated . . . among themselves and with [the manufacturer] both to enlist the
aid of [the manufacturer] and to enforce dealers’ promises to forsake the
discounters.”).
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hub-and-spoke conspiracy simply incorporates vertical elements in
order to facilitate horizontal collusion.212
The Supreme Court handed down five decisions between 1940
and 1970 inferring horizontal conspiracies from a series of vertical
relationships.213 These decisions recognizing hub-and-spoke
agreements have never been overturned.214 The decisions
generally hold that the totality of circumstances surrounding
vertical restraints may also provide circumstantial evidence of a
horizontal conspiracy.215 The disparate legal treatment of vertical
and horizontal relationships in antitrust law did not exist during
this time but recent Supreme Court cases continue to endorse the
older hub-and-spoke decisions.216 Each of the more recent decisions
continue to recognize that vertical agreements facilitating a
horizontal conspiracy may warrant per se treatment even if
vertical agreements are evaluated under the rule of reason.217
The Seventh Circuit’s landmark case, Toys “R” Us v. FTC,218
forcefully articulated the legal standards for the hub-and-spoke
conspiracy (in keeping with past Supreme Court decisions).219 In
this case, the toy retailer faced competition from discount
212. See Interstate Circuit, 306 U.S. at 202 (describing the inference standard
for hub-and-spoke conspiracies).
213. See cases cited supra note 211 and accompanying text (listing four
Supreme Court hub-and-spoke cases).
214. See cases cited supra note 211 and accompanying text (listing four
Supreme Court cases that have not been overturned).
215. See cases cited supra note 211 and accompanying text (describing the
inference standard for a hub-and-spoke agreement).
216. See Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 58 n. 28 (1977)
(“There may be occasional problems in differentiating vertical restrictions from
horizontal restrictions . . . but we do not regard the problems of proof as
sufficiently great to justify a per se rule.”); see also Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp
Elec. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 734–35 (1988) (explaining that the per se rule applied
also in Klor’s, Parke, Davis, and General Motors); Leegin Creative Leather Prods.,
Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 892–94 (2007) (explaining that price
maintenance agreements could facilitate horizontal cartels).
217. See Leegin, 551 U.S. at 892–94 (explaining that although vertical and
horizontal agreements are treated differently under the law, these elements can
blur together to form horizontal conspiracies).
218. See In re Toys “R” Us, Inc., 126 F.T.C. 415, 574–82 (1998) (discussing the
agreement between Toys R Us and its manufacturers).
219. See id. (stating that the agreement between Toys “R” Us and its
manufacturers mirrored the conspiracy in the Interstate Circuit decision but also
included direct evidence of an agreement).
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warehouse clubs and met individually with each of its
manufacturers to ask them to restrict offerings to warehouse
clubs.220 After explaining the policy, Toys “R” Us asked each
manufacturer how it intended to proceed.221 Each manufacturer
eventually agreed to sell the differentiated products in order to
eliminate competition for Toys “R” Us on the condition that the
others also agreed to do so.222
The FTC promptly found that these negotiations constituted
vertical agreements and discarded the defendant’s arguments that
the agreement was governed by the Colgate doctrine.223 These
points were not challenged on appeal but the Seventh Circuit still
condemned the Colgate defense, stating that “unilateral actions of
the sort protected by Monsanto and Colgate are not the same thing
as a retailer’s request to the manufacturer to change the latter’s
business practice.”224 As in Beech-Nut and Bausch & Lomb, Toys
“R” Us went beyond announcing its terms of sale to its distributors
in order to effectuate a larger scheme.225
Further, the court went on to acknowledge that the ten
vertical agreements formed the spokes of a hub-and-spoke
conspiracy.226 Toys “R” Us worked for years to establish vertical
arrangements but was unsuccessful until the seven manufacturers
finally accepted “on the condition that their competitors would do
the same.”227 This crucial fact was lethal to Toys “R” Us’ defense
220. See Toys “R” Us v. FTC, 221 F.3d 928, 930–32 (7th Cir. 2000) (describing
the facts specific to the alleged conspiracy).
221. See id. (noting Toys “R” Us’ role in policing the conspiracy).
222. See id. at 934 (stating that the parties were “forcing the clubs’ customers
to buy products they did not want, and frustrating customers’ ability to make
direct price comparisons of club prices and Toys R Us prices).
223. See id. at 937 (“The Commission rejected the point, because it found that
TRU had repeatedly crossed the line from unilateral to concerted behavior in
illegal ways . . . .”).
224. See
id.
(“[U]nilateral
actions
of
the
sort
protected
by Monsanto and Colgate are not the same thing as a retailer’s request to the
manufacturer to change the latter’s business practice.”).
225. See id. at 932 (describing the efforts of Toys R Us).
226. See id. (“TRU was not content to stop with vertical agreements. Instead,
the Commission found, it decided to go further.”).
227. See id. at (noting that one executive “made a point to tell each of the
vendors that we spoke to that we would be talking to our other key suppliers.”).
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and was the key to establishing the horizontal rim of the wheel.228
Using a variety of “plus factors,” the Seventh Circuit found
sufficient evidence to exclude the possibility of independent
action.229
First, it would have been contrary to a manufacturer’s
self-interest to enter into these agreements independently.230 The
manufacturers wanted to diversify from Toys “R” Us products;
warehouse clubs were a lucrative opportunity and were beneficial
for consumers due to their lower mark-ups.231 Second, the court
found that the manufacturers would not have engaged in this
practice independently; the companies were “reluctant to give up
a fast-growing, and profitable channel of distribution” and feared
that a rival “who broke ranks and sold to the clubs might gain sales
at their expense.”232
This analysis was more recently confirmed by the Second
Circuit when it inferred a horizontal conspiracy in United States v.
Apple233—also known as the “eBook case.”234 Citing Toys “R” Us
and Interstate Circuit, the court recognized the existence of a
hub-and-spoke conspiracy orchestrated by Apple when it entered
the e-book market.235 In order to compete with Amazon, the court
found that Apple enlisted the Big Six publishers in the United
States into most-favored-nation clauses in which the publishers
retained the right to set prices of e-books (set at caps of $14.99,

228. See id. at 934 (analyzing the horizontal conspiracy).
229. See id. at 936 (concluding that there was sufficient evidence to dispel the
independent self-interest theory).
230. See id. (noting the assurances that the warehousing clubs received in
joining the conspiracy).
231. See id. (“[I]nternal documents from the manufacturers revealed that they
were trying to expand, not to restrict, the number of their major retail outlets
and . . . [t]hey were specifically interested in cultivating a relationship with the
warehouse clubs.”).
232. See id. at 932 (stating that the behavior was not consistent with the
firms’ independent competitive motives).
233. See United States v. Apple, Inc., 791 F.3d 290, 313–14 (2d Cir. 2015)
(finding the existence of an antitrust conspiracy among publishing companies).
234. See id. (stating that the district court correctly found that Apple
orchestrated a conspiracy among the Big Six publishers in order to increase
prices).
235. See id. at 297 (stating that the conspiracy was organized in order to avoid
the “necessity of competing with Amazon.”).
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$12.99, and $9.99).236 This structure created strong incentives to
increase prices and it led to this exact result.237 In finding a
horizontal conspiracy, the court relied on the contractual
agreements offered by Apple—which would only be attractive if the
publishers acted collectively to shift Amazon away from a discount
strategy to an agency model.238 The court also examined the
collusive nature of the publishing industry and the fact that the
Big Six CEOs met on a quarterly basis without counsel and “had
no qualms communicating about the need to act together.”239 The
court found that there was sufficient evidence showing that an
agreement was “more likely than not,” stressing that the character
and “effect of a conspiracy are not to be judged by dismembering it
and viewing its separate parts, but only by looking at it as a
whole.”240
Franchise agreements should be condemned under the same
analysis.241 The contractual provisions in franchise agreements
often implement no-poach agreements between restaurants, which
are horizontal entities competing for the same labor pool.242 The
236. See id. (describing the scheme set forth by Apple).
237. See id. at 300 (“Because they ‘did not compete with each other on price,’
but over authors and agents, the publishers ‘felt no hesitation in freely discussing
Amazon’s prices with each other and their joint strategies for raising those
prices.’” (quoting United States v. Apple, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 2d 638, 651 (S.D.N.Y.
2013))).
238. See id. (detailing the evidence indicating the existence of a horizontal
conspiracy).
239. See id. (describing the close-knit nature of communications between the
publishing companies).
240. See id. (citing Cont’l Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S.
690, 699 (1962) (applying the per se standard although the dissent judge argued
for a rule of reason standard)).
241. See
No-Poach
Approach,
U.S.
DEP’T
OF
JUST.,
https://www.justice.gov/atr/division-operations/division-update-spring-2019/nopoach-approach (last updated Sept. 30, 2019) (last visited Oct. 09, 2019)
(explaining that in three cases involving franchise agreements, the Antitrust
Division filed statements of interest urging that the correct analysis was the rule
of reason) [https://perma.cc/4ZTU-RCPW].
242. See Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer, & Feld LLP, A Fresh Approach to
No-Poach
Provisions
in
Franchise
Agreements
(Apr.
2,
2019),
https://www.akingump.com/images/content/1/0/v2/102953/A-Fresh-Approach-toNo-Poach-Provisions-in-Franchise-Agreements..pdf (last visited Dec. 9, 2019)
(explaining the issues of no-poach analysis in franchise agreements)
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vertical agreement is present through the standard contract
provisions between the franchisor and franchisee.243 The issue is
demonstrating the horizontal relationship between franchisees.244
However, as in Toys “R” Us, the franchise contract’s no-poach
provision only makes sense for franchisees on the condition that
all other franchisees sign it.245 As shown in Part II.B, the nature of
no-poach restrictions supports finding a horizontal conspiracy.246
If franchisees sign this provision without the knowledge that all
other franchisees will participate, the provision is not in their
individual self-interest.247 They will simply stop competing in the
labor market while everyone else continues to do so.248 However,
with the mutually assured compliance guaranteed by the
franchisor’s standard contract, a franchisee can safely benefit from
the no-poach conspiracy.249 The end result is that the franchise can
deter employee turnover and depress wages through its
franchisees.250 If the horizontal rim of the agreement is shown in
this manner, the franchisor and franchisees should then both be
held liable under the per se rule condemning market allocations.251
In short, the key to this analysis is to present enough evidence
pointing to the existence of a horizontal rim; it is not enough to
rely on the mere existence of a series of vertical agreements.252
[https://perma.cc/7W4N-PJVN].
243. See id. (describing a franchise agreement).
244. See No-Poach Approach, supra note 241 (explaining that franchisees are
each independent entities).
245. See supra notes 230–232 and accompanying text (discussing how
no-poach agreements are only effective when employers conspire).
246. See supra Part II.B (describing how the inference standard for horizontal
agreements applies to no-poach agreements).
247. See Toys “R” Us v. FTC, 221 F.3d 928, 932 (7th Cir. 2000) (describing an
anti-competition scheme among toy manufacturers whereby they only
participated with the knowledge that their competitors participated).
248. See id. (explaining the incentives for joining a conspiracy).
249. See Deslandes v. McDonald’s USA, LLC, 2018 WL 3105955, at * 2 (N.D.
Ill. June 25, 2018) (explaining the implications of McDonald’s standard franchise
agreement).
250. See id. (stating that the agreement strengthens the franchisers hiring
influence and allows the franchisee to keep costs low.)
251. See cases cited supra note 211 and accompanying text (listing Supreme
Court precedent for application of the per se rule when a hub-and-spoke
conspiracy is demonstrated).
252. See, e.g., Dickson v. Microsoft, 309 F.3d 193, 203–05 (4th Cir. 2002)
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Caution is warranted on this point because some courts have
required more evidence than others.253 In a case implicating the
musical instrument retailer Guitar Center, the Ninth Circuit
seemed to nearly require direct evidence of collusion between the
horizontal conspirators.254 In this case, the plaintiffs alleged that
Guitar Center pressured five leading guitar manufacturers into
accepting minimum advertising price terms.255 Several significant
“plus factors” were alleged: that defendants shared a common
motive to conspire, the manufacturers acted against their
self-interest, the manufacturers simultaneously adopted
substantially similar agreements, an FTC consent decree finding
that defendants participated in an illegal information exchange,
and the fact that retail prices rose as the number of units sold
fell.256 Despite an abundance of circumstantial evidence—
consistent with what the Supreme Court has required in the past—
the Ninth Circuit did not infer a horizontal conspiracy.257
Additionally, the DOJ’s analysis within its statement of
interest concerning the Cinnabon litigation also reaffirms that
evidence beyond the existence of the franchise agreement is
essential.258 The DOJ seems to suggest, though, that franchise
(stating that vertical distribution agreements between Microsoft and original
equipment manufacturers was not sufficient to establish a conspiracy among the
manufacturers without evidence of a rim to the wheel); PepsiCo, Inc. v. Coca-Cola
Co., 315 F.3d 101, 111 (2d Cir. 2002) (stating that loyalty agreements forcing
distributors to offer either Pepsi or Coke products exclusively did not, on their
face, constitute a hub-and-spoke conspiracy).
253. Compare In re Text Messaging Antitrust Litig., 630 F.3d 622, 629 (7th
Cir. 2010) (“Circumstantial evidence can establish an antitrust conspiracy."), with
United States v. Apple, Inc., 791 F.3d 290, 315 (2d Cir. 2015) (“Parallel action is
not by itself, sufficient to prove the existence of a conspiracy.”).
254. See In re Musical Instrs. & Equip. Antitrust Litig., 798 F.3d 1186, 1189
(9th Cir. 2015) (stating that despite substantial circumstantial evidence,
“plaintiffs’ “plus factors” add nothing . . . we affirm the judgment of the district
court dismissing plaintiffs’ § 1 claim.”).
255. See id. at 1189–90 (describing the plaintiff’s allegations and theory of
harm).
256. See id. at 1194 (noting the lack of direct evidence while listing six “plus
factors” alleged in the plaintiff’s complaint).
257. See id. at 1189 (stating that the agreement could be indicative of
conscious parallelism rather than concerted action).
258. See Stigar, supra note 111, at 20 (“The key to the per se illegal hub-andspoke conspiracy is ‘the existence of a rim to the wheel in the form of an agreement
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agreements are more likely to be categorized as rimless
conspiracies where “parallel but independent vertical agreements
are not per se unlawful; they are subject to the rule of reason.”259
The agency notes that even if plaintiffs had successfully pleaded
the rim to the conspiracy, that the “franchise relationship . . . is a
legitimate business collaboration in which the franchisees operate
under the same brand.”260 Because of this, the no-poach
agreements would be considered ancillary restraints to be
evaluated under the rule of reason.261 First, as explained above,
there is an argument to condemn franchise no-poach restraints as
a hub-and-spoke conspiracy and multiple district courts have
agreed.262 Second, as explained in Part IV, this conclusion that nopoach agreements are covered by the ancillary restraints doctrine
is questionable.263 More on point within this section, the ancillary
restraints concern has no meaning in the analysis for finding a
hub-and-spoke conspiracy.264 Per se treatment would apply if a
hub-and-spoke conspiracy is found.265 The rule of reason would
only become appropriate if the defendant successfully makes out a

among the horizontal competitors.’”).
259. See Stigar, supra note 111, at 21 (“Here, there is no indication that
plaintiffs have successfully pleaded the existence of a ‘rim’ on which to base a
‘hub-and-spoke’ conspiracy.”).
260. See Stigar, supra note 111, at 21 (distinguishing franchise no-poach
agreements from typical hub-and-spoke conspiracies).
261. See Stigar, supra note 111, at 21 (“No-poach agreements would thus
qualify as ancillary restraints if they are reasonably necessary to the legitimate
franchise collaboration and not overbroad.”).
262. See supra notes 241–251 and accompanying text (noting the case for
condemning franchise no-poach agreements under a hub-and-spoke analysis); see
also, e.g., Butler v. Jimmy John’s Franchise, LLC, 331 F. Supp. 3d 786, 797 (S.D.
Ill. July 31, 2018) (noting that the claimant plausibly stated a hub-and-spoke
conspiracy where “the ‘hub’ firm enters into a collection of vertical agreements
with other firms—the ‘spokes’—and those spokes then enter into a collection of
horizontal agreements that make up the ‘wheel’”).
263. See infra Part IV (describing how a defendant would make an ancillary
pro-competitive justification argument).
264. See Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2284 (2018) (describing the
§ 1 burden-shifting test).
265. See, e.g., Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208 (1939)
(inferring a per se illegal horizontal conspiracy where the agreement only
benefitted competitors if they each agree to similar terms with the ‘hub’—who
facilitates and assures this compliance).
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pro-competitive justification defense after the plaintiff meets their
burden.266
D. Evading the Intra-Enterprise Doctrine or Copperweld Defense
One final issue that arises in the context of proving an
agreement between vertically oriented firms is the
intra-enterprise doctrine.267 When a corporation coordinates its
activities with a parent, subsidiary, affiliated corporations, or
agents, these actions may fall outside of § 1 according to the
Copperweld doctrine.268 The boundary for firms which can be
“Copperwelded” is unclear, however, since this case involved a
corporation and its wholly owned subsidiary.269 The Supreme
Court explicitly left the door open in this decision as to which other
situations warrant exemption from § 1.270 Lower courts have
extended this doctrine outside of the parent and wholly owned
subsidiary relationship, however.271 Most courts have held that the
Copperweld doctrine extends to agreements between sister
corporations.272 Similarly, some courts have held that corporations
266. See Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. at 2284 (“If the plaintiff carries its
burden, then the burden shifts to the defendant to show a procompetitive rational
for the restraint.”).
267. See Copperweld Corp. v. Indep. Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 759 (1984)
(“[P]rovides that § 1 liability is not foreclosed merely because a parent and its
subsidiary are subject to common ownership . . . .”).
268. See id. at 753 (stating that a parent and a wholly owned subsidiary must
be viewed as a single enterprise which unilaterally makes decisions).
269. See id. (“Review of this case calls directly into question whether the
coordinated acts of a parent and its wholly owned subsidiary can, in the legal
sense contemplated by § 1 of the Sherman Act, constitute a combination or
conspiracy.”).
270. See id. 753 (construing the facts narrowly as pertaining to a wholly
owned subsidiary and parent company).
271. See Crosby v. Hosp. Auth. of Valdosta & Lowndes Cty., 93 F.3d 1515,
1529 (11th Cir. 1996) (“[S]taff physicians may in certain contexts be agents of the
hospital for purposes of state action immunity.”).
272. See generally Eichorn v. AT&T Corp., 248 F.3d 131 (3d Cir. 2001);
Advanced Health-Care Servs. v. Radford Cmty. Hosp., 910 F.2d 139, 146 (4th Cir.
1990); Odishelidza v. Aetna Life & Cas. Co., 853 F.2d 21, 23 (1st Cir. 1988);
Directory Sales Mgmt. Corp. v. Ohio Bell Tel. Co., 833 F.2d 606, 611 (6th Cir.
1987); Greenwood Utils. Comm’n v. Miss. Power Co., 751 F.2d 1484, 1497 n. 8
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owned by the same holding group are incapable of conspiring.273
Most courts have found that parents and majority-owned
subsidiaries are incapable of conspiring although the degree of
control required has never been precisely defined.274
However, in 2010, the Supreme Court provided some
clarifying guidance, as if to steer the courts away from more
formalistic rule-setting, in its American Needle, Inc. NFL
decision.275 The Court revisited the Copperweld doctrine, noting
that the key to the analysis is “whether the parties act on interests
separate from those of the firm itself” or if the agreement
“joins . . . separate decisionmakers” pursuing separate economic
interests.276 In other words, if the parties are joined in an
agreement but have independent economic interests, they are not
acting unilaterally as one entity.277
In 1993, before the current spotlight on no-poach agreements
and before American Needle, the Ninth Circuit stated in Williams
v. I.B. Fishcher Nevada278 that franchisors and franchisees of a
fast-food restaurant cannot conspire under the antitrust laws.279
The claim theorized that “no-switching” agreements by
Jack-in-the-Box constituted a group boycott (rather than a

(5th Cir. 1985).
273. See, e.g., Century Oil Tool Co. v. Prod. Specialties, 737 F.2d 1316, 1317
(5th Cir. 1984) (stating that there is no difference between two a parent and
wholly owned subsidiary and two corporations wholly owned by the same
persons).
274. See, e.g., Siegel Transfer, Inc. v. Carrier Express, 54 F.3d 1125, 1133 (3d
Cir. 1995) (stating that a 99.92% owned subsidiary is ‘Copperwelded’); Computer
Identics Corp. v. S. Pac. Co., 756 F.2d 200, 205 (1st Cir. 1985) (stating that an
80% owned subsidiary cannot conspire with its parent).
275. See American Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 560 U.S. 183, 196
(2010) (holding that the Copperweld doctrine did not apply to member teams of a
sports league since the inquiry was not based on legal structure but competitive
realities).
276. See id. at 184 (highlighting the importance of evaluating competitive
realities rather than legal structure).
277. See id. at 191 (“[W]e have eschewed such formalistic distinctions in favor
of a functional consideration of how the parties involved . . . actually operate.”).
278. See Williams v. I.B. Fischer Nev., 999 F.2d 445, 448 (9th Cir. 1993)
(holding that franchisors and franchisees were incapable of conspiring).
279. See id. at 447 (stating that the franchisor and franchisees’ interests
continue beyond the payment of the licensing fee).
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horizontal market allocation of the labor market).280 Specifically,
franchisees could not offer employment to another franchisee’s
manager within six months of the manager’s termination without
a release from the franchisee.281 The court found that the degree of
control and uniformity that the centrally managed franchisor
demanded from its franchisees supported the existence of a
“common enterprise.”282 The court looked past evidence that each
franchise could charge its own prices, that the franchise agreement
called its franchisees “independent contractors,” and the argument
that the relationship was more appropriately categorized as a
licensing relationship.283
However, this decision predates the Supreme Court’s view in
American Needle that “the inquiry is one of competitive reality.”284
In this decision, the Court held that NFL teams were
independently owned and managed businesses that competed with
one another.285 The Court focused on the fact that the teams
typically pursue their own individual efforts when they license
intellectual property rather than the interests of the whole
league.286 In other words, “[t]o a firm making hats, the Saints and
the Colts are two potentially competing suppliers of valuable
trademarks.”287 The teams compete against each other in the
market for intellectual property and are capable of conspiring
under § 1 by jointly authorizing NFL Properties to award exclusive
licenses on their behalf.288
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. See Williams v. I.B. Fischer Nev., 794 F. Supp. 1026, 1030–33 (D. Nev.
1992) (describing the independence of the franchisees and franchisors).
283. See id. (rejecting plaintiffs’ contrary arguments).
284. See American Needle, Inc., v. Nat’l Football League, 560 U.S. 183, 196
(2010) (stating that the inquiry is one of competitive reality).
285. See id. (holding that the Copperweld doctrine did not apply to member
teams of a sports league since the inquiry was not based on legal structure but
competitive reality).
286. See id. at 197 (“The NFL teams do not possess either the unitary
decisionmaking quality or the single aggregation of economic power characteristic
of independent action.”).
287. See id. (explaining that NFL teams are competitors in the market for
licensed merchandise).
288. See id. (“[T]he teams voted to authorize NFLP to grant exclusive licenses,
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No-poach agreements operate in a similar fashion.289 Each
franchisee pursues its own independent economic interests
through hiring and recruitment efforts.290 It is in each franchise
restaurant’s best interest to compete for high-quality employees in
order to increase productivity and profitability.291 Like any other
no-poach restraint and like the restraint in American Needle, a
franchise no-poach restraint curbs competition among competing
entities.292 This allows entities to act against their individual
competitive interests by conspiring to depress wages and prevent
employee turnover between them.293 This is the key to establishing
that vertically related firms are separate entities under § 1.294
As a final point, it did not matter to the Supreme Court in
American Needle that the league, by its nature, required the teams’
cooperation in order to compete against other sports leagues or
forms of entertainment.295 The Court seemed reluctant to broadly
immunize football leagues and other ventures from the reach of
antitrust law in this way.296 Instead, the Court stated that this
question of cooperation is better suited to assessing the legitimacy
of a pro-competitive justification.297 This analysis overrules the
and NFLP granted Reebok International Ltd. an exclusive 10-year license . . . .”).
289. See Ogden v. Little Caesar, 393 F. Supp. 3d 622, 633 (E.D. Mich. 2019)
(“[I]n the market for employees, the McDonald’s franchisees and McOpCos within
a locale are direct, horizontal, competitors.”).
290. See Deslandes v. McDonald’s USA, LLC, 2018 WL 3105955, at * 2 (N.D.
Ill. June 25, 2018) (“Franchisees . . . are also responsible for the day-to-day
operations of their respective restaurants and for . . . hiring.”).
291. See id. (explaining that McDonald’s franchisee hiring decisions were
restricted by the no-hire provision).
292. See Butler v. Jimmy John’s Franchise, LLC, 331 F. Supp. 786, 792 (S.D.
Ill. 2018) (“[A]greements made among direct competitors . . . always or almost
always tend to restrict competition and decrease output.”).
293. See Yi v. SK Bakeries, LLC, No. 18-5627 RJB, 2018 WL 8918587, at *5
(W.D. Wash. Nov. 13, 2018) (“Even a person with a rudimentary understanding
of economics would understand that if competitors agree not to hire each other’s
employees, wages for employees will stagnate.”).
294. See American Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 560 U.S. 183, 183
(2010) (explaining how the relevant inquiry is one of operation, not form).
295. See id. at 199 (“The justification for cooperation is not relevant to
whether that cooperation is concerted or independent action.”).
296. See id. at 202–03 (stating that football teams needing to cooperate are
not limited by antitrust law because “the special characteristics of this industry
may provide a justification” for many kinds of agreements”).
297. See id. (noting that in some instances, the justification may warrant rule
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Ninth Circuit’s previous conclusion in Williams v. I.B. Fischer
Nevada, that franchises are single entities because they inherently
require cooperation and uniformity.298 In the no-poach context,
although franchisee or other entities’ cooperative efforts may be
required in certain aspects to support a larger venture, the venture
should not necessarily be summarily immunized.299 The question
of the franchise should be evaluated in more detail when asserted
as a defense.300
III. Element Two: Analyzing the Restraint’s Reasonableness
Under the Per Se, Quick-Look, or Extended Rule of Reason
Standard
The second element, an unreasonable restraint of trade, will
be governed by one of three possible standards of review.301 These
standards require different showings by the plaintiff.302 Per se
review only requires that the plaintiff show the existence of a
presumptively unlawful per se restraint.303 Quick-look or
abbreviated rule of reason analysis requires that the plaintiff show
the existence of an inherently anticompetitive restraint which one
with only a rudimentary understanding of economics would infer

of reason analysis but was “still concerted activity under the Sherman Act that is
subject to § 1 analysis.”).
298. See Williams v. I.B. Fishcher Nev., 794 F. Supp. 1026, 1032 (D. Nev.
1992) (“[T]he franchisor does everything in its power to minimize competition and
promote uniformity between franchises.”).
299. See American Needle, 560 U.S. at 200 (“[I]ntrafirm agreements may
simply be a formalistic shell for ongoing concerted action.”).
300. See id. at 202–03 (noting that in some instances, the justification may
warrant rule of reason analysis but was “still concerted activity under the
Sherman Act that is subject to § 1 analysis”).
301. See Agnew v. NCAA, 683 F.3d 328, 335 (7th Cir. 2012) (“Courts have
established three categories of analysis—per se, quick-look, and Rule of
Reason . . . though the methods often blend together.”).
302. See id. (explaining the requirements of the different standards).
303. See, e.g., NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 104 (1984) (“Per se rules
are invoked when surrounding circumstances make the likelihood of
anticompetitive conduct so great as to render unjustified further examination of
the challenged conduct.”).
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to be anticompetitive.304 The quick-look standard specifically does
not require that the plaintiff demonstrate the defendant’s market
power.305 Finally, the extended rule of reason is the most onerous;
it requires elaborate economic analysis, including demonstrating
market power, in order to show anticompetitive effects.306 The nopoach antitrust plaintiff has a good case for per se condemnation
but should assert quick-look review in the alternative.307 An
extended rule of reason case presents potential challenges, which
may be difficult, but not impossible, for a plaintiff to surmount.308
A. The Agencies’ Position That No-Poach Agreements Warrant
Per Se Treatment Is the Most Convincing Theory
As described in Part I.C.1, the DOJ and FTC have
convincingly outlined the theory that no-poach agreements are per
se illegal market allocations.309 The settlement of every single
“pure” horizontal no-poach case (between competitor universities,
railway
component
companies,
technology
companies)
demonstrates the strength of this argument.310 In cases involving
vertically oriented firms, however, the plaintiff should anchor onto
the agencies’ statements in the HR Guidelines, which note that a
304. See Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 691 (1978)
(“While [this act] is not [per se illegal] price fixing as such, no elaborate industry
analysis is required to demonstrate the anticompetitive character of such an
agreement.”).
305. See Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 109
As a matter of law, the absence of proof of market power does not
justify a naked restriction on price or output. To the contrary, when
there is an agreement not to compete in terms of price or output, “no
elaborate industry analysis is required to demonstrate the
anticompetitive character of such an agreement.”
(quoting Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978)).
306. See Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2284 (2018) (“The rule of
reason requires courts to conduct a fact-specific assessment of “market power and
market structure . . . to assess the restraint’s actual effect” on competition.”).
307. See infra Parts III.A–B (describing the applicability of the per se rule and
quick-look in the alternative).
308. See discussion infra Part III.C (describing a rule of reason analysis in the
no-poach context).
309. See discussion supra Part I.C (describing the DOJ and FTC’s application
of antitrust law in the no-poach context).
310. See discussion supra Part I.C (describing the DOJ’s no-poach actions).
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firm’s downstream market position is inconsequential.311
Additionally, the DOJ in a statement of interest in a franchise case
has confirmed this analysis.312 Further, a recent decision in the
Southern District of California found a per se illegal restraint
when “unlike agreements made up and down a supply chain
between buyers and sellers, Defendants [who] use their nopoaching restraints . . . with virtually all other [medical service
sub-contractors], thereby compromise[e] their [sub-contractors’]
ability to compete freely to hire qualified travelers and sell
medical-traveler services to hospitals.”313 The court focused not on
the vertical element in the downstream markets but on the
horizontal effect of the restraint on the relevant employment
market.314
In other words, an antitrust plaintiff’s argument should be
that the relevant market for a no-poach agreement is the labor
market.315 The restraint does not restrain competition for iPhones,
for example, but for employees.316 And in the labor market, an
electronic equipment producer can compete for the same

311. See HR GUIDANCE, supra note 26, at 2 (“From an antitrust perspective,
firms that compete to hire or retain employees are competitors in the employment
marketplace, regardless of whether the firms make the same products or compete
to provide the same services.”).
312. See Stigar, supra note 111, at 20 (“Even though the typical no-poach
agreement between a franchisor and one of its franchisees is vertical, it could be
horizontal if it restrains competition between the two interrelated entities.”).
313. See Aya Healthcare Services, Inc. v. AMN Healthcare Inc., No. 17cv205MMA (MDD), 2018 WL 3032552, at *10 (S.D. Cal. June 19, 2018) (focusing on the
horizontal aspects of the no-poach restraint).
314. See id. (noting that per se treatment applied given the pervasiveness of
the vertical restraints and their horizontal effect on the labor market); see also
Yi v. SK Bakeries, LLC, No. 18-5627 RJB, 2018 WL 8918587, at *4 (W.D. Wash.
Nov. 13, 2018) (discussing vertical and horizontal elements in the agreements not
to solicit or hire Cinnabon employees); Butler v. Jimmy John’s Franchise, LLC,
331 F. Supp. 786, 795 (S.D. Ill. 2018) (recognizing vertical elements but stating
that the “effects are felt strictly at the horizontal level”).
315. See Deslandes v. McDonald’s USA, LLC, No. 17 C 4857, 2018 WL
3105955, at *8 (N.D. Ill. June 25, 2018) (“This case . . . is not about competition
for the sale of hamburgers to consumers. It is about competition for employees,
and, in the market for employees, the McDonald’s franchisees and McOpCos
within a locale are direct, horizontal, competitors.”).
316. See id. (describing the relevant market).

428

26 WASH. & LEE J. CIV. RTS. & SOC. JUST. 381 (2019)

employees that an electronic device manufacturer would.317 In
other words, there are multiple markets that a firm participates
in.318 It can operate in a certain downstream product market while
also operating in supply-side markets, such as the labor market.319
Its competitors in these markets may differ and these competitors
may be partners in other markets.320 Ultimately, the labor market
is the one that is relevant for no-poach agreements; a vertical
relationship in another market does not change the fact that the
firms are competitors in the labor market.321 If this argument is
successful, the plaintiff can use the agencies’ theory to assert a per
se illegal market allocation—even though it is between two entities
who share a vertical element in other markets.322
B. The Plaintiff Should Argue for Quick-Look Analysis in the
Alternative
Under the quick-look standard, courts may condemn
restraints which “an observer with even a rudimentary
understanding of economics could conclude . . . have an
anticompetitive effect on customers and markets.”323 An analysis
of this framework reveals that no-poach agreements are a perfect
example of restraints that should be condemned under a quick-look
317. See HR GUIDANCE, supra note 26, at 2 (“From an antitrust perspective,
firms that compete to hire or retain employees are competitors in the employment
marketplace, regardless of whether the firms make the same products or compete
to provide the same services.”).
318. See United States v. Iron Mountain, Inc., 217 F. Supp. 3d 146, 152
(D.D.C. 2016) (describing National Records Center, Inc. as a competitor in
multiple markets).
319. See Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 50 F.3d 1041, 1051 (D.C. Cir. 1995)
(recognizing the distinction between labor markets and product markets).
320. See id. (describing restraints on competition that may have an effect on
the labor market but not the product market).
321. See HR GUIDANCE, supra note 26, at 2 (“From an antitrust perspective,
firms that compete to hire or retain employees are competitors in the employment
marketplace, regardless of whether the firms make the same products or compete
to provide the same services.”).
322. See discussion supra Part I.C (describing the DOJ and FTC’s application
of antitrust law in the no-poach context).
323. See Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 770 (1999) (noting the
standard for quick-look analysis).
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because they directly restrain price competition.324 As a result, a
plaintiff should be able to meet the initial burden of proof without
showing evidence of market power or other elaborate industry
analysis.325
In one of the Supreme Court’s first quick-look cases—National
Society of Professional Engineers v. United States326—a group of
competitors agreed not to discuss prices with their customers until
they selected an engineer.327 Although the restraints were not per
se illegal, the Court found that they completely banned competitive
bidding, price comparisons, and “imposed[d] the Society’s view of
the costs and benefits of competition on the entire marketplace.”328
In other words, the restraint very closely resembled a variety of
per se violations but did not quite fall into any of those
categories.329 Rather than go to the extended rule of reason, the
Court found that this was a facially anticompetitive restraint since
price is the “central nervous system of the economy” and an
agreement interfering with this competition is “illegal on its
face.”330 It also held that “no elaborate industry analysis was
required to demonstrate the anticompetitive character of the
agreement.”331

324. See, e.g., Butler v. Jimmy John’s Franchise, LLC, 331 F. Supp. 786, 792
(S.D. Ill. 2018) (“[A]greements made among direct competitors . . . always or
almost always tend to restrict competition and decrease output.”).
325. See California ex rel. Harris v. Safeway, Inc., 651 F.3d 1118, 1134 (9th
Cir. 2011) (“Full rule of reason treatment is unnecessary where the
anticompetitive effects are clear even in the absence of a detailed market
analysis.”).
326. See Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 697 (1978)
(finding that a canon of ethics prohibiting competitive bidding was not justified
under Rule of Reason).
327. See id. at 691 (describing the association’s agreement).
328. See id. at 694–95 (noting the restraint’s effect was to eliminate price
competition).
329. See id. at 692 (“While this is not price fixing as such, no elaborate
industry analysis is required to demonstrate the anticompetitive character of
such an agreement.”).
330. See id. at 692–93 (citing United States v. Container Corp., 393 U.S. 333,
337 (1969)).
331. See id. (noting the abbreviated review due to the egregious nature of the
alleged violation).

430

26 WASH. & LEE J. CIV. RTS. & SOC. JUST. 381 (2019)

In NCAA v. Board of Regents, the Supreme Court again
condemned restraints on a quick-look.332 In this decision, the Court
found that the effects of the NCAA’s scheme to control teams’
television rights were apparent; NCAA teams lost their freedom
to compete, the restraints increased price while lowering output,
and most importantly—the restraints caused price and output to
become unresponsive to customer preference.333 The defendant did
not try to rebut these findings, in effect admitting that the
restraints were naked.334 Instead, the defendant stated that the
NCAA lacked the market power necessary to affect supply and
demand in the market.335 The Supreme Court rejected “this
argument for two reasons, one legal, one factual.”336 It found that
as a matter of law, that the “absence of proof of market power does
not justify a naked restriction on price or output.”337 The restraint
was inconsistent with the “Sherman Act’s command that price and
supply be responsive to consumer preference. We have never
required proof of market power in such a case.”338 In addition to
this, the Court found that as a factual matter, the NCAA did
possess market power.339
In FTC v. Indiana Federation of Dentists, the Supreme Court
once again rejected the Seventh Circuit’s requirement that the
plaintiff define the dentists’ market power.340 The Court again
332. See NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 107 (1984) (“Because it
restrains price and output, the NCAA's television plan has a significant potential
for anticompetitive effects.”).
333. See id. (“A restraint that has the effect of reducing the importance of
consumer preference in setting price and output is not consistent with [the]
fundamental goal of antitrust law.”).
334. See id. at 109 (“Petitioner does not quarrel with the District Court’s
finding that price and output are not responsive to demand.”).
335. See id. (“Petitioner argues, however, that its television plan can have no
significant anticompetitive effect since the record indicates that it has no market
power—no ability to alter the interaction of supply and demand in the market.”).
336. Id.
337. Id.
338. Id.
339. See id. (arguing that the NCAA did did possess market power in a
narrower market for football broadcasting).
340. See FTC v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 460 (1986) (“[E]ven if the
restriction imposed by the Federation is not sufficiently “naked” to call this
principle into play, the Commission’s failure to engage in detailed market
analysis is not fatal to its finding of a violation of the Rule of Reason.”).
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concluded that this step was unnecessary because an agreement to
restrict insurers’ access to patients’ x-rays was a direct restraint
on output.341 The restraint impeded the natural flow of the market
and impaired “the ability of the market to . . . ensure the provision
of desired good and services to consumers at a price approximating
the marginal cost of providing them.”342 In the absence of a
pro-competitive justification, the Court condemned them as naked
restrictions.343
Quick-look analysis is inappropriate where the plaintiff fails
to show that anticompetitive effects are obvious or
“rudimentary.”344 For example, it was unclear to the Supreme
Court in California Dental whether restraints on deceptive
advertising would harm competition or increase consumer
confidence—thereby creating a greater demand for dental
services.345 It was similarly unclear to lower courts whether
banning independent team websites had redeeming value to the
NHL, whether a racing association restrained competition by
forbidding the use of a certain transmission, or whether the
agreement to install x-ray machines limiting the size of bags
created anticompetitive effects.346
No-poach agreements are not subject to the same defects; the
effect of a no-poach restraint is clear.347 Under the Engineers
341. See id. (finding that the defendant’s restraints were naked restraints on
trade).
342. See id. at 459 (describing the economic effects of the restraint).
343. See id. (“[T]he evidence did not support a finding that the careful use of
x rays as a basis for evaluating insurance claims is in fact destructive of proper
standards of dental care.”).
344. See FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 570 U.S. 136, 159 (2013) (refusing to apply a
quick-look approach because an observer with a rudimentary understanding of
economics could not conclude that the arrangements in question were
anticompetitive).
345. See Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 770 (“The case before us,
however, fails to present a situation in which the likelihood of anticompetitive
effects is comparably obvious.”).
346. See Madison Square Garden, L.P. v. Nat’l Hockey League, 270 F. App’x
56, 59 (2d Cir. 2008); Cont’l Airlines v. United Airlines, 277 F.3d 499, 511 (4th
Cir. 2002); Brookins v. Int’l Motor Contest Ass’n, 219 F.3d 849, 853–54 (8th Cir.
2000).
347. See, e.g., Yi v. SK Bakeries, LLC, No. 18-5627 RJB, 2018 WL 8918587,
at *5 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 13, 2018) (“Even a person with a rudimentary
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standard, where price is the central nervous system of the economy
and agreements interfering with price competition are illegal,
no-poach restraints should be condemned.348 These agreements
prevent employees from obtaining pricing information necessary
to ascertain the competitive value of their labor.349 Additionally, as
in Board of Regents and Federation of Dentists, no-poach
agreements disrupt the natural flow of the free market so that
price (wages) and output (productivity) are not responsive to
employer demand; both are artificially depressed.350 There does
not appear to be any efficiency benefit from franchise no-poaching
agreements in the relevant labor market.351
In its statements of interest in franchise no-poach cases, the
Department of Justice appears reluctant to extend the quick-look
given the vertical elements involved.352 It first states, without
citing a source, that “quick-look analysis does not apply to a
vertical agreement between a franchisor and a franchisee.”353
However, the Supreme Court’s quintessential quick-look cases
outline cases in which participating member teams agreed to
restraints imposed by the NCAA or when professionals agreed to

understanding of economics would understand that if competitors agree not to
hire each other’s employees, wages for employees will stagnate.”).
348. See Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978)
(“[A]n agreement that ‘interferes with the setting of price by free market forces’
is illegal on its face.”).
349. See Yi, 2018 WL 8918587, at *5 (explaining how no-hire provisions
deflate wages).
350. See FTC v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 461 (2009) (stating that
disrupting the proper functioning of the price-setting mechanism of the market
should be condemned).
351. See Interview by GCR USA with Joseph Simons, Chairman, Fed. Trade
Comm’n, (Dec. 13, 2018) (“The FTC doesn’t see what the benefits of a non-compete
agreement are when there is no highly skilled labour involved . . . There doesn’t
seem to be any efficiency benefit, so outlawing that would seem not to have a cost
to it; actually it might have a benefit.”).
352. Compare Statement of Interest Ry. Indus. Emp., supra note 56, at 16
(stating that a per se rule was inapplicable in the case of McDonald’s having nohire provisions with franchisees), with HR GUIDANCE, supra note 26, at 2 (“From
an antitrust perspective, firms that compete to hire or retain employees are
competitors in the employment marketplace, regardless of whether the firms
make the same products or compete to provide the same services.”).
353. See Stigar, supra note 111, at 22 (stating that quick-look is generally
inapplicable to vertical franchise agreements).
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restraints that were formalized by a professional trade
organization.354
The agency then quickly shifts its analysis, stating that when
no-poach restraints are ancillary to the franchise system, then “by
definition, quick-look analysis is not appropriate.”355 However, this
only holds true where an pro-competitive argument is accepted.356
For example, in NCAA v. Board of Regents, the Court recognized
that the NCAA’s rules play “a vital role in enabling college football
to preserve its character, and as a result enables a product to be
marketed . . . and hence can be viewed as procompetitive.”357 This
did not stop the Supreme Court from condemning the restraints
under a quick-look because the restraints were not necessary to
further these pro-competitive goals.358
Essentially, the agency seems to be asserting that the vertical
nature of the franchise relationship inherently creates doubt that
the restraint can be readily condemned as anticompetitive.359 But
the DOJ’s concern with vertical efficiencies is, again, more
appropriately placed at the stage that the defendant asserts a
pro-competitive justification.360 However, this Note makes note
that it is unlikely that a defendant will be able to properly assert
354. See supra notes 326–343 and accompanying text (noting Supreme Court
jurisprudence on quick-look analysis).
355. See Stigar, supra note 111, at 22 (“The ‘quick-look analysis’ applies only
in rare cases ‘when the great likelihood of anticompetitive effects can easily be
ascertained,’ and it is ‘implausible’ that procompetitive benefits would outweigh
harm to competition.”).
356. See, e.g., NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 114 (1984) (condemning
the restraint because it “cannot be said that "the agreement on price is necessary
to market the product at all").
357. Id. at 102.
358. See id. at 106–07 (“The anticompetitive consequences of this
arrangement are apparent. Individual competitors lose their freedom to compete.
Price is higher and output lower than they would otherwise be, and both are
unresponsive to consumer preference.”).
359. See Stigar, supra note 111, at 12 (“Accordingly, because vertical
territorial allocation agreements may have both procompetitive and
anticompetitive effects, courts evaluate their legality using the rule of reason’s
balancing approach.”).
360. See Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2284 (2018) (“If the plaintiff
carries its burden, then the burden shifts to the defendant to show a
procompetitive rational for the restraint.”).
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a pro-competitive justification under the ancillary restraints
doctrine.361 As a result, at the least, quick-look treatment will
likely apply.362
C. As a Last Resort, Plaintiff Can Make a Claim Under the Rule
of Reason
Plaintiffs should try to avoid an extended rule of reason
analysis because of the likely difficulties of proving market
power.363 However, plaintiffs can still attempt to meet their initial
burden under the extended rule of reason by: (1) showing an
adverse effect on competition by direct evidence of anticompetitive
effects or (2) by showing circumstantial evidence of the defendants’
market power.364
Under the second method, when the defendant has a dominant
share of the market or entry or expansion barriers exist, the court
may infer adverse effects on competition.365 Although market
power is defined as the power to foreclose competitors or raise
prices and can be evidenced by many qualitative factors, courts
tend to look heavily at market share.366 Concern tends to arise
361. See discussion infra Part IV (noting the strict requirements in asserting
a procompetitive justification).
362. See supra notes 326–343 and accompanying text (noting Supreme Court
jurisprudence on quick-look analysis).
363. See Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274 (stating that it would be difficult
for a plaintiff challenging a vertical agreement between a franchisor and
franchisee to find sufficient market power).
364. See id. at 2285–84
The plaintiffs can make this showing directly or indirectly. Direct
evidence of anticompetitive effects would be “proof of actual
detrimental effects [on competition],” such as reduced output,
increased prices, or decreased quality . . . . Indirect evidence would be
proof of market power plus some evidence that the challenged restraint
harms competition.
(citations omitted).
365. See id. (explaining that adverse effects can be implied by market power).
366. See Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 7 (1984)
(indicating that a firm must have at least a 30% market share to infer market
power); see also Drug Emporium, Inc. v. Blue Cross, 104 F. Supp. 2d 184, 189
(W.D.N.Y. 2000) (stating the Supreme “Court has concluded that as a matter of
law a defendant with 30% or less of the relevant market lacked market power for
an antitrust violation”).
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when the defendants’ market share is around thirty to thirty-five
percent.367 The focus on market share is so strong that some courts
may initially require a showing of market power, however, to
dispose of cases without merit.368
1. Showing Direct Evidence of Anticompetitive Effects
However, the first method of showing direct evidence of
effects, or “proof of actual detrimental effects such as a reduction
of output,” obviates the need for an inquiry into market power.369
The Supreme Court noted direct evidence of anticompetitive effects
where insurers were unable to obtain X-rays in locations
dominated by the Federation.370 The evidence of “sustained
adverse effects on competition in those areas where IFD dentists
predominated, viewed in light of the reality that markets for dental
services tend to be relatively localized, is legally sufficient to
support a finding that the challenged restraint was unreasonable
even in the absence of elaborate market analysis.”371
Proof of actual harm “can obviate the need for an inquiry into
market power,” since the entire purpose of deducing market power
is to determine the potential for anticompetitive effects.372 In the
no-poach context, evidence of actual anticompetitive effect could
367. See Drug Emporium, 104 F. Supp. 2d at 189 (stating market power
benchmarks).
368. See, e.g., In re Sulfuric Acid Antitrust Litig., 703 F.3d 1004, 1007 (7th
Cir. 2012) (stating that “by definition, without [market power] a firm or group of
firms can’t harm competition”).
369. See FTC v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 461 (2000) (“[T]he finding
of actual, sustained adverse effects on competition . . . viewed in light of the
reality that markets for dental services tend to be relatively localized, is legally
sufficient to support a finding that the challenged restraint was unreasonable
even in the absence of elaborate market analysis.”); see also United States v. Visa
U.S.A., Inc., 344 F.3d 229, 240 (2d Cir. 2003) (stating that there was sufficient
evidence of anticompetitive harm based on reduced card output, fewer card
features, decreased network services, and stunting of price and innovation).
370. See Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. at 461 (stating that actual effects of
competitive harm were apparent).
371. See id. (stating that that the inquiry into market power is but a
“surrogate for detrimental effects”).
372. See id. (describing the essential purpose of the market power analysis).
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include: decreases or increases in salaries across industries,
whether employees who leave suffer pay cuts when switching to
other industries or roles, and whether it takes longer for displaced
employees to find work in another field.373 If the plaintiff is able to
demonstrate this type of evidence, rule of reason analysis may be
much less burdensome.374
2. Showing Circumstantial Evidence of Anticompetitive Effects
In the event that direct evidence of harm is absent or the court
first requires a market power inquiry, the plaintiff must turn to
circumstantial evidence based on market share as demonstrated
by qualitative factors and other economic analyses.375 The first
step is to define the relevant market.376 This allows the court to
identify significant competitors who would be able to constrain the
defendant’s monopsony power.377 At this point, relative market
shares can then be computed.378 This process has to be performed

373. See Todd v. Exxon Corp., 275 F.3d 191, 202–04 (2d Cir. 2001) (describing
potential direct evidence of anticompetitive effect).
374. See United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 668 (3d Cir. 1993) (stating
that a plaintiff can satisfy their burden under the Rule of Reason by proving the
existence of actual anticompetitive effects, “such as reduction of output . . .
increase in price, or deterioration in quality of goods or services”).
375. See, e.g., NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 110 n. 42 (1984) (“While
the reasonableness' of a particular alleged restraint often depends on the market
power of the parties involved, because a judgment about market power is the
means by which the effects of the conduct on the market place can be assessed,
market power is only one test of 'reasonableness.”).
376. See Times-Picayune Publ’g Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 611–13
(1953) (outlining the steps in relevant market definition); see also United States
v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 527 (1948) (same).
377. See, e.g., Se. Mo. Hosp. v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 642 F.3d 608, 613 (8th Cir.
2011) (“Determining the limits of a relevant . . . market requires identifying the
choices available to consumers.”); Geneva Pharms. Tech. Corp. v. Barr Labs.,
Inc., 386 F.3d 485, 496 (2d Cir. 2004) (“The goal in defining the relevant market
is to identify the market participants and competitive pressures that restrain an
individual firm’s ability to raise prices or restrict output.”); Doctor’s Hosp. v. Se.
Med. Alliance, 123 F.3d 301, 311 (5th Cir. 1997) (“To define a market is to identify
producers that provide customers of a defendant firm (or firms) with alternative
sources for the defendant’s products or services.”).
378. See Times-Picayune Publ’g Co., 345 U.S. at 612 (evaluating the
percentages of market share among competitors).
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twice—for the relevant supply (rather than product) market and
the geographic market.379
The objective, in a monopsony labor market, is to draw a
boundary between buyers of labor who are competing with one
another for employees and those that are not competing for the
same pool of labor.380 The focal point is the interchangeability of
the firms in the eyes of employees; in other words, to identify the
employers who are reasonable substitutes for employment. 381 The
inquiry asks whether “from the perspective of an . . . employee, a
job opportunity in the oil industry [is interchangeable] with, for
example, one in the pharmaceutical industry.”382 The focus is on
whether an employer is interchangeable, whether it can serve as a
substitute for a competitor’s fleeing employees if that competitor
exercises its market power by lowering wages.383
It is in the plaintiff’s best interest to define the relevant
markets as narrowly as possible since a defendant’s market share
in a smaller market will be larger than in a broader one.384 This
will likely come down to how specialized the employees are (in
addition to how far employees would travel for other potential
employment).385 This is because it is “consistent with common
379. See Se. Mo. Hosp., 642 F.3d at 613 (describing the relevant product
analysis and geographic market definition).
380. See, e.g., Todd v. Exxon Corp., 275 F.3d 191, 202 (2d Cir. 2001)
(explaining that “in such a case, ‘the market is not the market of competing sellers
but of competing buyers. This market is comprised of buyers who are seen by
sellers as being reasonably good substitutes.’”); see also Campfield v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 532 F.3d 1111, 1118 (5th Cir. 2008) (same).
381. See Exxon Corp., 275 F.3d at 202 (“This market is comprised of buyers
who are seen by sellers as being reasonably good substitutes.”).
382. See id. (“Plaintiff is right to urge that ‘the proper focus is . . . the
commonality and interchangeability of the buyers, not the commonality or
interchangeability of the sellers.”).
383. See id. (“Where market power is exercised by buyers, it is the elasticity
of the sellers' supply that is at issue.”).
384. See FTC v. Sysco Corp., 113 F. Supp. 3d 1, 26 (D.D.C. 2015) (“[M]arket
definition is guided by the ‘narrowest market principle’ . . . The circle must be
drawn narrowly to exclude any other product . . . .”).
385. See Exxon Corp., 275 F.3d at 203 (citing Bruce C. Fallick, A Review of the
Recent Empirical Literature on Displaced Workers, 50 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 5,
12 (1996) (“Less technical jobs tend to involve skills that are not as industryspecific, creating greater cross-elasticity for these employees.”)).
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sense and empirical research that employees’ industry-specific
experience may cause them to suffer a pay cut if forced to switch
industries.”386 These questions tend to make certain positions less
substitutable than others and makes the market narrower
(inflating the market share of the firms in this smaller market).387
In the same way, specialization may decrease the size of the
relevant geographic market.388 Employees may be less willing to
substitute to other regions where their industry or role is not as
well represented.389 This would also shrink the relevant geographic
market.390
By contrast, less technical jobs (such as those held by
non-managerial franchise employees) “tend to involve skills that
are not as industry-specific, creating greater cross elasticity for
these employees” in other roles.391 This conclusion that specialized
professionals (such as engineers, technology specialists, and
therapists) constitute smaller relevant markets seems to square
with the cases brought by the antitrust enforcement agencies.392
386. See id. (citing Elisabetta Magnani, Risk of Labor Displacement and
Cross-Industry Labor Mobility, 54 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 593, 593–94 (2001)
(referring to the empirical research indicating that wage losses generally
accompany industry mobility)).
387. See supra text accompanying note 384 (describing how defining the
relevant market impacts the computation of market shares); see also infra text
accompanying note 391 (describing the effect of specialized roles on the crosselasticity of demand for these roles.
388. See Eichorn v. AT&T Corp., 248 F.3d 131, 147 (3d Cir. 2001)
(“Additionally, we have said, ‘the relevant geographic market is the area in which
a potential buyer may rationally look for the goods or services he or she seek.’”
(quoting Pa. Dental Ass’n v. Med. Serv. Ass’n, 745 F.2d 248, 260 (3d Cir. 1984))).
389. See id. (stating that geographic markets must conform to commercial
realities).
390. See FTC v. Sysco Corp., 113 F. Supp. 3d 1, 51 (D.D.C. 2015) (outlining
the defendant’s arguments that the relevant market should have been larger and
included more firms).
391. See Todd v. Exxon Corp., 275 F.3d 191, 203 (2d Cir. 2001) (citing Bruce
C. Fallick, A Review of the Recent Empirical Literature on Displaced Workers, 50
INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 5, 12 (1996) (noting the impact of employee specialization
on the labor market)).
392. See Complaint, In re Your Therapy Source, LLC., No. 1710134 (FTC July
31, 2018) (concerning the employment of therapy professionals); Stipulation and
Proposed Final Judgment, United States v. Knorr-Bremse AG, No. 1:18-cv-00747
(D.D.C. Apr. 3, 2018) (concerning the employment of engineers and other highly
specialized rail component positions); In re High-Tech Empl. Antitrust Litig., 856
F. Supp. 2d 1103 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 18, 2012) (concerning the employment of
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By contrast, non-managerial restaurant franchise employees may
be able to switch to roles in retail franchises, supermarkets, or
various other types of roles.393 In addition to the relevant labor
market, the geographic region may be more expansive where the
industry is less specialized.394
The courts will first consider qualitative characteristics of the
market in order to define the substitutability of certain roles in
various geographic regions.395 One qualitative factor is whether
the industry views the defendant as a competitor in the proposed
market (and whether the defendant views itself that way).396
Customers’ views on the interchangeability of demand may also be
probative.397 In the Second Circuit’s Todd v. Exxon decision, the
plaintiff contended that “the defendants’ own conduct and
apparent perceptions support the alleged product market.”398
technology professionals).
393. See Exxon Corp., 275 F.3d at 202–03 (“The district court found that
"plaintiff fails to adequately explain why an antitrust lawyer employed by an oil
company does not compete in the same market as an antitrust lawyer at a
commercial bank or in a private law firm.”).
394. See, e.g., E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Kolon Indus., 637 F.3d 435,
441 (4th Cir. 2011) (“The relevant geographic market inquiry focuses on that
geographic area within which the defendant’s customers who are affected by the
challenged practice can predictably turn to alternative suppliers if the defendant
were to raise prices or restrict its output.”).
395. See Brown Shoe v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 325 (1962) (listing
several practical indicia to discern interchangeability of use and cross-elasticity
of demand).
396. See United States v. Cont’l Can Co., 378 U.S. 441, 453–55 (1964) (relying
on the fact that can and bottle makers compare prices); United States v. Microsoft
Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 52–53 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (rejecting middleware products in
relevant market for search engines/OS since Microsoft viewed it as only a
potential threat); United States v. Oracle Corp., 331 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1121,
1160–61 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (rejecting proposed market since the term “high
function” software lacked meaning in the industry).
397. See, e.g., FTC v. Lundbeck, 650 F.3d 1236, 1240 (8th Cir. 2011) (stating
that two drugs were not interchangeable since prescribers did not switch between
the two); Jacobs v. Tempur-Pedic Int’l, 626 F.3d 1327, 1338 (11th Cir. 2010)
(stating that consumer preference was not adequately accounted for in defining
the relevant product market); Fineman v. Armstrong World Indus., 980 F.2d 171,
199 (3d Cir. 1992) (considering consumer preference for different types of floor
coverings to suit certain room); R.D. Imps. Ryno Indus. v. Mazda Distribs., 807
F.2d 1222, 1225 (5th Cir. 1987) (finding that the market included foreign and
domestic cars that consumers chose as substitutes).
398. See Todd v. Exxon Corp., 275 F.3d 191, 205 (2d Cir. 2001) (describing the
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Notably, the defendant relied on salary information within the
petrochemical industry to execute the restraint; the plaintiff
asserted that their reliance on this industry specific data indicated
the relevant market.399 The Second Circuit noted that this
argument was dismissed too hastily by the District Court since
“industry recognition is well-established as a factor that courts
consider in defining a market . . . [and that] economic actors
usually have accurate perceptions of economic realities.”400 As a
result, the defendant’s own data and conclusions about its
competitive standpoint in the labor market can be very useful in
assessing the relevant market.
One other factor that tends to indicate a defendant’s market
power is that labor markets are inherently inelastic (unresponsive
to changes in price).401 This creates a situation where employers
may possess more power than their market share indicates since
employees cannot easily respond to wage decreases. For example,
“supply could be elastic if . . . [employees] have the option of
withholding some output from the market in hopes of higher prices
in future years.”402 However, labor is “an extremely perishable
commodity—an hour not worked today can never be recovered.”403
As a result, “collusion among employers can drive the wage down
to the individual’s reservation wage” since employees cannot easily
substitute or “switch” to alternative employment to mitigated the
hours they lose.404 The supply of labor, as a result, will not respond
as quickly to changes in wages and this constitutes a strong
structural indicator of the defendant’s inflated market power.405
defendant’s conduct with respect to defining the relevant market).
399. See id. at 204 (“In other words, the very fact that defendants rely on data
regarding MPT salaries in the oil and petrochemical industry suggests that this
is the relevant market.”).
400. See id. at 205 (citing Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 325
(1962); Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210, 219 n.4
(D.C. Cir. 1986)).
401. See id. at 211 (“[T]he supply of labor has an inherently inelastic quality.”)
402. Id. at 201 (citing Roger D. Blair & Jeffrey L. Harrison, Antitrust Policy
and Monopsony, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 297, 313 (1991)).
403. See id. (describing the inelasticity of demand impacting labor markets).
404. See id. at 211 (explaining the effects of collusion on employees).
405. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER
GUIDELINES § 7.2 (2010) [hereinafter MERGER GUIDELINES] (“The prospect of harm
depends on the collective market power, in the relevant market, of firms whose
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While qualitative indicators of market power may defend
against a 12(b)(6) motion for dismissal, at trial, a plaintiff would
also have to show economic evidence of the cross-elasticity of
supply for employees and the geographic regions in which they
operate.406 The primary economic test for this purpose is the
hypothetical monopolist test.407 This method—employed by the
FTC, Antitrust Division, and the vast majority of courts—asks
whether a “hypothetical monopolist” is likely to impose a small but
significant and non-transitory increase in price (SSNIP).408 If the
hypothetical monopolist could sustain a price increase at this level,
the product market and geographic area indicated by the firm or
firms is the relevant market.409
A plaintiff should note that this test does not examine every
reasonable substitute but only those that constrain the dominant
firm from raising prices.410 As a result, the plaintiff should
distinguish potential substitutes that would not adequately
constrain the defendant’s market power. In line with this concept,
the “smallest market principle” will also help a plaintiff narrowly
incentives to compete are substantially weakened by coordinated conduct. This
collective market power is greater, the lower is the market elasticity of demand.”).
406. See, e.g., Flovac v. Airvac, 84 F. Supp. 3d 95, 102 (D.P.R. 2015), aff’d, 817
F.3d 849 (1st Cir. 2016) (“[A]n antritrust plaintiff facing a properly configured
summary-judgment motion, . . . must still marshal competent ‘adequate evidence
to establish a genuine issue of material fact.’ And because defining the relevant
market is, at bottom, a ‘key economic question,’ it stands to reason that [plaintiff]
introduce some type of economic evidence . . . .”) (citations omitted).
407. See, e.g., In re Se. Milk Antitrust Litig., 739 F.3d 262, 277–78 (6th Cir.
2014) (noting the mechanics of the SSNIP in geographic market definition);
MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 405, § 4.2 (stating that the mechanics of the
hypothetical monopolist test are the same for product market and geographic
market definition).
408. See In re Se. Milk, 739 F.3d at 277–78 (describing the SSNIP test or
hypothetical monopolist inquiry).
409. See, e.g., MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 405, § 4.1.1 (“Specifically, the
test requires that a hypothetical profit-maximizing firm, not subject to price
regulation, that was the only present and future seller of those products
(‘hypothetical monopolist’) likely would impose at least a small but significant and
non-transitory increase in price . . . .”).
410. See MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 405, § 4.1.1 (“Market shares of
different products in narrowly defined markets are more likely to capture the
relative competitive significance of these products, and often more accurately
reflect competition between close substitutes.”); see also United States v. H&R
Block, Inc., 833 F. Supp. 2d 36 (D.D.C. 2011).
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define the relevant market.411 If one were to draw a circle around
a firm, applying the test and extending the circle to the next
potential substitute firms until the hypothetical monopolist could
raise prices, this point would demarcate the bounds of the relevant
markets—even though other larger supply and geographic
markets may also exist.412 This principle helps define a market
that is neither too narrow nor too broad, where interchangeability
becomes more speculative.413
IV. Defending Against an Ancillary Pro-Competitive Justification
If a plaintiff shows an agreement and an unreasonable
restraint of trade under one of the three standards of review, the
defendant can assert that the restraint was ancillary to a larger
pro-competitive goal.414 Luckily, if a plaintiff can meet the initial
burden, it is likely that the defendant will not be able to
successfully assert a pro-competitive justification.415
First, what is an ancillary restraint? Judge Taft first
introduced the concepts of naked and ancillary restraints in United
States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co.416 He rejected a bid-rigging
scheme, stating that “no conventional restraint of trade can be
enforced unless . . . it is merely ancillary to the main purpose of a
411. See, e.g., FTC v. Sysco Corp., 113 F. Supp. 3d 1, 26 (D.D.C. 2015)
(“[M]arket definition is guided by the ‘narrowest market’ principle. . . . The circle
must be drawn narrowly to exclude any other product to which, within reasonable
variations in price, only a limited number of buyers will turn”).
412. See id. (describing the smallest market principle).
413. See MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 405, § 4.2 (“[H]ypothetical
monopolist test ensures that markets are not defined too narrowly, but it does not
lead to a single relevant market.”).
414. See Major League Baseball Props., Inc. v. Salvino, Inc., 542 F.3d 290, 337
(2d Cir. 2008) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (explaining that the rule of reason
applies to ancillary restraints—those that a part of a larger endeavor and are
necessary for it to reach its “efficiency-enhancing benefits”); see also Stop & Shop
Supermarket Co. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 373 F.3d 5, 63 (1st Cir. 2004)
(“[R]estraints that are truly ancillary to a larger efficiency-gaining enterprise . . .
are not normally condemned per se without looking at likely consequences.”).
415. See infra Parts IV.A–C (describing the outer bounds of the ancillary
restraints doctrine).
416. See United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 282 (6th Cir.
1898), aff’d, 175 U.S. 211 (1899) (articulating the ancillary restraints doctrine for
the first time).
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lawful contract, and necessary to protect the covenantee in the full
enjoyment of the legitimate fruits of the contract . . . .”417 First,
Judge Taft found that where the aim of the restraint is merely to
restrain competition, it is naked and “there [is] nothing to justify
or excuse the restraint.”418 He then qualified the ancillary
restraints doctrine by stating than an ancillary restraint must be
“commensurate with the reasonable protection of the covenantee
in respect to the main transactions affected by the contract.”419
Finally, Judge Taft famously warned that “[t]here are some cases
in which the courts, mistaking, as we conceive, the proper limits of
the relaxation of the rules . . . have set sail on a sea of doubt . . . in
respect to contracts which have no other purpose . . . [other] than
the mutual restraint of the parties.”420 No-poach agreements
usually fall within this category.421 Outside of a limited few cases,
if a no-poach plaintiff can meet his burden under either the per se,
quick-look, or extended rule of reason standard, it is unlikely that
a defendant will be able to successfully assert a pro-competitive
justification in response.422
A. First, Collaboration or Integration Is Required
A careful analysis of the ancillary restraints doctrine supports
the conclusion that no-poach agreements are often not intended to
promote any collaborative effort designed to bring pro-competitive
benefits to consumers. To distinguish an ancillary restraint from a
naked restraint, the first step is to determine if the restraint is
417. See id. (noting that without the ancillary restraints doctrine, nearly
every contract would be an illegal restraint of trade).
418. See id. (using the term ‘naked’ to describe restraints of trade with no
conceivable pro-competitive aim).
419. See id. (limiting the reach of the ancillary restraints doctrine to those
restraints that are necessary to perpetuate the contract or collaboration).
420. See id. at 284 (hinting that to the extent an ancillary restraint’s benefits
are unclear, courts should not speculate and extend this doctrine beyond its
appropriate reach).
421. See infra Parts IV.A–C (describing how no-poach restraints are likely to
fail under the ancillary restraints doctrine).
422. See infra Parts IV.A–C (describing the outer bounds of the ancillary
restraints doctrine).
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made with respect to a larger venture or collaboration.423 In Polk
Bros., Inc. v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc.,424 Judge Easterbrook
declared that “cooperation is the basis of productivity. It is
necessary for people to cooperate in some respects before they may
compete in others, and cooperation facilitates efficient
production.”425 By contrast, naked restraints are agreements that
do not promote collaboration at the time they are adopted.426
Easterbrook illustrated this principle, stating that, “[i]f two
people meet one day and decide not to compete, the
restraint . . . does nothing but suppress competition. If A hires B
as a salesman and passes customer lists to B, then B’s reciprocal
covenant not to compete with A is ancillary” to a pro-competitive
venture.427 The collaboration in Polk Bros fell into the latter
category; two businesses entered a lease agreement for a shared
building and agreed to divide between them the types of products
they would sell.428 This restraint was an agreement that allowed
the firms to collaborate safely; it limited free-riding where one
company could spend large amounts of money on advertising—only
to be undercut by its neighbor at the last second.429 It allowed the
companies to complement each other’s products and created a new
offering to the public.430
423. See 11 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 28, § 1907 (1998) (analyzing
the steps with respect to raising a pro-competitive efficiency argument); see, e.g.,
Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 560 U.S. 183, 203 (2013) (“When
‘restraints on competition are essential if the product is to be available to all,’ per
se rules of illegality are appropriate, and instead the restraint must be judged
according to the flexible Rule of Reason.”); Augusta News Co. v. Hudson News
Co., 269 F.3d 41, 48 (1st Cir. 2001) (“[I]t is commonly understood today that per
se condemnation is limited to ‘naked’ . . . agreements, that is, those that are not
part of a larger pro-competitive joint venture.”).
424. Polk Bros., Inc. v. Forest City Enters., Inc., 776 F.2d 185 (7th Cir. 1985).
425. Id. at 188 (citing Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., 465 U.S. 752
(1984)).
426. See id. at 189 (explaining that the restraint’s benefits are judged by the
time they are entered).
427. See id. (describing the ancillary restraints doctrine and when it applies).
428. See id. at 187–88 (describing the venture).
429. See id. at 190 (“[T]he control of free riding is a legitimate objective of a
system of distribution.”).
430. See id. (“Cooperation is the basis of productivity. It is necessary for
people to cooperate in some respects before they may compete in others, and
cooperation facilitates efficient production.”).
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Similarly, in Broadcast Music v. Columbia Broadcasting
System,431 the Supreme Court found that the collaboration
between thousands of authors and composers to grant licenses for
a blanket fee was not a naked restraint.432 It “accompanied the
integration of sales, monitoring, and enforcement,” to offer benefits
to buyers and sellers of the music.433 In NCAA v. Board of Regents
of University of Oklahoma,434 the Supreme Court also found that
the NCAA’s broadcast provisions may be necessary to coordinate
its member teams “if the product is to be available at all” to the
public.435 In all of these cases, the restraint was intended to
facilitate larger collaborations between competing entities.
By contrast, in Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States,436
the Supreme Court found that a cartel was not a pro-competitive
venture since there was no integration and its sole purpose was to
eliminate a competitor.437 In Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical
Society,438 the Court also found that a price-fixing agreement was
a naked restraint in the absence of any meaningful integration
between network doctors.439 The joint network of doctors was
simply a grouping of independent competitors, it did not promise
any new, integrated service options, and it only resulted in the
manipulation of prices for medical care.440 A similar case in the
Seventh Circuit met similar results; in General Leaseways, Inc. v.
431. Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
432. See id. at 7 (remanding for analysis under the rule of reason rather than
condemning the restraint as per se unlawful).
433. See id. at 2 (stating its rationale for rule of reason treatment).
434. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
435. See id. at 100 (applying the quick-look or abbreviated rule of reason
standard of review).
436. See Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951),
overruled by Copperweld Corp. v. Indep. Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984).
437. See id. at 596 (accepting the lower court’s findings that the purpose of
the restraint was to protect each other’s markets and eliminate other
competition).
438. Arizona v. Maricopa Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332 (1982).
439. See id. at 355 (stating that the pricing lists coordinated by the medical
society were per se unlawful violations instituted by competitors).
440. See id. (“[T]he foundations are not analogous to partnerships or other
joint arrangements in which persons who would otherwise be competitors pool
their capital and share the risks of loss as well as the opportunity for profit . . . .”).
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National Truck Leasing Ass’n,441 Judge Posner stated that a
trucking association was not integrated with the purpose of
creating any new functionality and “sells nothing.”442 Finally, in
Palmer v. BRG of Georgia, Inc.,443 the Supreme Court found that
agreements to divide the bar preparation market were per se
violations.444 No other cooperation between the firms occurred,
they were simply competitors dividing market territories.445
Additional Seventh Circuit decisions further support the idea that
productive output and integrative efforts are required.446 Other
jurisdictions concur in this analysis as well.447
One of the only plausible integrations exists when two firms
engage in a joint venture where the no-poach restraint is designed
to prevent employee raiding during the collaboration or to protect
intellectual property that certain employees may possess.448
441. General Leaseways, Inc. v. Nat’l Truck Leasing Ass’n, 744 F.2d 588 (7th
Cir. 1984).
442. See id. at 595 (“The per se rule would collapse if every claim of economies
from restricting competition, however implausible, could be used to move a
horizontal agreement not to compete from the per se rule to the rule of reason
category.”).
443. Palmer v. BRG of Ga., Inc., 498 U.S. 46 (1990).
444. See id. at 50 (citing United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596,
608 (1972) (“The defendants in Topco had never competed in the same market,
but had simply agreed to allocate markets.”)).
445. See id. (“Such agreements are anticompetitive regardless of whether the
parties split a market within which both do business or whether they merely
reserve one market for one and another for the other.”).
446. See Blackburn v. Sweeney, 53 F.3d 825 (7th Cir. 1995) (stating that
attorneys’ agreements not to advertise in certain territories were naked market
divisions because they were unrelated to the dissolution of their partnership or
any collaborative purpose); Blue Cross & Blue Shield United v. Marshfield Clinic,
65 F.3d 1406 (7th Cir. 1995) (stating that the clinic failed to allege that the
restraint was related to their Free Flow collaboration and that, therefore, the
restraint could not be ancillary).
447. See, e.g., United States v. Apple, 791 F.3d 290, 326 (2d Cir. 2015) (stating
that Apple’s per se illegal price fixing agreements with publishers were not
necessary to implement the iBookstore); Engine Specialties v. Bombardier, 605
F.2d 1, 11 (1st Cir. 1979) (“[T]he fact that the alleged territorial restrictions were
facially connected to a joint venture cannot immunize it from the reach of the
antitrust laws.”); New York ex rel. Spitzer v. St. Francis Hosp., 94 Supp. 2d 399
(S.D.N.Y. 2000) (“[C]laims of improved quality of service do not shield price-fixing
and market allocation activities from per se treatment.” (quoting Arizona v.
Maricopa Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 351 (1982))); United States v. Dynalectric Co.,
859 F.2d 1559, 1562 (11th Cir. 1988).
448. See AYA Healthcare Services, Inc. v. AMN Healthcare, Inc., 2018 WL
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Additionally, no-poach agreements may protect the value of an
investment, such as the purchase of a business and its assets.449
Finally, and only with respect to asserting an integration between
firms, no-poach agreements may be ancillary to a greater
integration between entities in a franchise system or other
vertically related entities.450 Beyond these collaborations, it is
difficult to conceive of a situation in which no-poach agreements
may facilitate an integration between firms. However, all three of
these potential justifications should fail in a no-poach case for
being either unnecessary to achieve the venture’s goal,451 or for
failing to promote pro-competitive efficiencies.452
B. Ancillary Restraints Must Be Commensurate with the Main
Transaction and Cannot Be Overly Broad
If the restraint facilitates a transaction, the restraint must be
commensurate or necessary to promote the main transactions
affected by the contract.453 This concept applies to non-compete
3032552, at *10–12, *15 (S.D. Cal. June 19, 2018) (finding that defendants were
plausibly engaged in a joint venture).
449. See Eichorn v. AT&T Corp., 248 F.3d 131, 143–45 (3d Cir. 2001) (finding
that a no-poach restriction conditioned on the sale of a business was an ancillary
transaction).
450. See Deslandes v. McDonald’s USA, LLC, 2018 WL 3105955, at *2, *7
(N.D. Ill. June 25, 2018) (weighing whether a no-poach restraint was ancillary to
the McDonald’s collaborative franchise venture).
451. See infra Part IV.B (stating that ancillary restraints must be necessary
to achieve the pro-competitive goals intended by the collaboration).
452. See infra Part IV.C (noting that only certain types of pro-competitive
justification arguments are recognized in antitrust law).
453. See 11 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 28, § 1907 (1998) (noting the
limits to the ancillary restraints doctrine). See, e.g., Eichorn v. AT&T Corp., 248
F.3d 131, 146 (3d Cir. 2001)
The question in every case involving a covenant not to compete
ancillary to the sale of a business is whether the restraint is reasonably
calculated to protect the legitimate interests of the purchaser in what
he has purchased, or whether it goes so far beyond what is necessary
as to provide a basis for the inference that its real purpose is the
fostering of monopoly.
Perceptron, Inc. v. Sensor Adaptive Machs., 221 F.3d 913, 919 (6th Cir. 2000)
(“Covenants not to compete are valid if (1) ancillary to the main business purpose
of a lawful contract, and (2) necessary to protect the covenantee's legitimate
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restraints particularly well and these restraints are comparable to
no-poach agreements in this respect.454 In deciding whether to
uphold this type of restraint, courts usually examine the

property interests, which require that the covenants be as limited as is reasonable
to protect the covenantee's interests.”);
LDDS Commc’ns v. Automated
Commc’ns, 35 F.3d 198, 199 (5th Cir. 1994)
The district court read the two covenants as exacting a nationwide
cease fire although they were part of a sale of assets in Arizona and
New Mexico . . . We resolve their ambiguity in favor of the lesser
restraint and are persuaded that these two covenants not to compete
are not fairly read to reach beyond Arizona and New Mexico.
Basicomputer Corp. v. Scott, 973 F.2d 507, 512 (6th Cir. 1992) (“[A] noncompetition covenant ‘is reasonable if it is no greater than is required for the
protection of the employer, does not impose undue hardship on the employee, and
is not injurious to the public.’” (quoting Raimonde v. Van Vlerah, 325 N.E.2d 544,
547 (1975))).
454. See, e.g., Global Telesystems v. IPNQwest, N.V., 151 F. Supp. 2d 478, 484
(S.D.N.Y. 2001) (granting a temporary restraining order prohibiting the
defendant from employing professional services of the defendant’s former
employee because there was a plain no-solicit and no-hire clause in an agreement
between the parties and the hiring would result in hardship to the plaintiff);
Automated Concepts Inc. v. Weaver, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11560, at *11–12
(N.D. Ill. 2000)
Unlike a covenant not to compete, which has the potential of
threatening a person’s livelihood, a covenant not to solicit employees
merely prohibits a person from pirating employees of the former
employer and inducing them to work for another entity . . . Thus, the
Court finds that an employer’s interest in preventing a current or
former employee from raiding its employee rosters is reasonable.
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reasonableness of the restraint with respect to duration,455
territory,456 and type of product or service.457
The Supreme Court, D.C. Circuit, and Seventh Circuit have
also condemned other types of restraints by these same metrics.458
In Blackburn v. Sweeney,459 the Seventh Circuit noted that the
455. See, e.g., Compton v. Metal Products, Inc., 453 F.2d 38, 45 (4th Cir. 2010)
(“[C]ovenants not to compete which are unlimited as to space or time are invalid
and unenforceable.”); Eichorn v. AT&T Corp., 248 F.3d 131, 145 (3d Cir. 2001)
(stating that a covenant not to compete does not violate the Sherman Act when
reasonably limited in time and territory); Tri-Continental Fin. Corp. v. Tropical
Marine Enters., 265 F.2d 619, 624–25 (5th Cir. 1959) (affirming lower court’s
finding that a restrictive covenant prohibiting the purchase of a vessel was
reasonable in time, territory, and extent); Sound Ship Bldg. Corp. v. Bethlehem
Steel Corp., 387 F. Supp. 252, 256 (D.N.J. 1975), aff’d, 533 F.2d 96 (3d Cir. 1976)
(finding that the covenant was reasonable under the meaning of the Sherman Act
because the covenant was “ancillary to the main purpose of the contract . . .
sufficiently limited in scope and time . . . Plaintiff has not alleged facts to indicate
[defendant] had monopolistic powers”); Alders v. AFA Corp., 353 F. Supp. 654,
656 (S.D. Fla. 1973), aff’d mem., 490 F.2d 990 (5th Cir. 1974) (“[I]t has been
recognized that the validity of covenants not to compete turns upon the
reasonableness of the restraint in each case.”).
456. See, e.g., Lektro-Vend Corp. v. Endo Co., 660 F.2d 255, 267 (7th Cir. 1981)
(“[M]ost modern courts will uphold a covenant to the extent that a breach of the
covenant has occurred within a reasonable geographic area and time period, and,
where applicable, with respect to a product reasonably related to the legitimate
purpose of the restraint.”); Domino’s Pizza, Inc. v. El-Tan, Inc., 1995 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 20550, at *10 (N.D. Okla. May 1, 1995) (finding that a covenant restricting
the operation of a pizza business after termination of the contract within a 10mile radius was reasonable); Verson Wilkins, Ltd. v. Allied Prods. Corp., 723 F.
Supp. 1, 12013 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (stating that territorial limits were unreasonable
because they were not limited to protecting goodwill).
457. See, e.g., Drury Inn-Col. Springs v. Olive Co., 878 F.2d 340, 343 (10th
Cir. 1989) (finding that the 20% price term set was “unrelated to the conduct and
action intended by the agreement.”); Newburger, Loeb & Co. v. Gross, 563 F.2d
1057, 1082–83 (2d Cir. 1977) (stating that a non-compete agreement was
reasonable where it limited only the trading of securities for a former employer’s
customers).
458. See Blackburn v. Sweeney, 53 F.3d 825 (7th Cir. 1995) (stating that
market allocation restraints were not ancillary to the sale of a business due to the
timing of the agreement); Palmer v. BRG of Ga., Inc., 498 U.S. 46 (1990)
(requiring an ancillary restraint to be limited to the geographical bounds the
larger agreement impacts); Polygram Holding, Inc. v FTC, 416 F.3d 29 (2005)
(limiting an ancillary restraint to the products at issue in the collaboration
between firms).
459. See Blackburn, 53 F.3d at 830 (“Therefore, because the harm suffered by
a consumer forced to pay inflated prices, and the harm inflicted on an excluded
competitor and onetime cohort . . . both result from the anti-competitive effect of
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timing of the agreement is essential; where a firm has disbanded,
it cannot argue that market allocation restraints were necessary
to protect the firms during their dissolution.460 Further, in Palmer,
the Court looked at geography, finding that an allocation of the
U.S. market as a whole went beyond the firms’ statement that the
restraint protected its interests regarding an acquisition in
Georgia.461 In reality, the restraint was intended to lock the
smaller company out of competition in other U.S. territories in
exchange for the entire Georgia market.462 Finally, in Polygram
Holding, Inc. v. F.T.C.,463 Judge Ginsburg of the D.C. Circuit found
that an agreement to limit advertising and discounting of The
Three Tenors’ two previous recordings went beyond the joint
venture’s purpose of distributing a recording of their 1998
concert.464 The restraint instead simply destroyed the “competition
of products that were not part of the joint undertaking.”465
No-poach agreements may be subject to these same defects.
The timing of a no-poach agreement should coincide with a
collaboration and not after the collaborative effort has been
completed.466 It cannot be unlimited in duration, geography, or
other relevant bounds.467 Another common issue is that if a
no-poach agreement applies broadly to all employees rather than

the cartel agreement, they are both antitrust injuries.”).
460. See id. at 828–29 (“Polk teaches that courts must look to the time an
agreement was adopted in assessing its potential for promoting enterprise and
productivity—or, in this case, competition in the legal market.” (citing Polk Bros.,
Inc. v. Forest City Enters., 776 F.2d 185, 189 (7th Cir. 1985))).
461. See Palmer v. BRG of Ga., Inc., 874 F.2d 1417 (11th Cir. 1989), rev’d, 498
U.S. 46 (1990) (“The written agreement has the effect of reducing price
competition in Georgia and markets into which BRG might have otherwise
entered absent the agreement.”).
462. See id. (“The agreement also has no redeeming procompetitive virtues.”).
463. Polygram Holding, Inc. v. FTC, 416 F.3d 29 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
464. See id. at 38 (“[M]ere profitability or cost savings have not qualified as a
defense under the antitrust laws.” (quoting Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010, 1023
(10th Cir. 1998))).
465. See id. (noting the restraint’s lack of pro-competitive effects).
466. See Blackburn v. Sweeney, 53 F.3d 825, 829 (7th Cir. 1995) (stating that
market allocation restraints were not ancillary to the sale of a business due to the
timing of the agreement).
467. See supra notes 453–465 and accompanying text (noting that the scope
of the restraint must be appropriately limited).
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certain joint venture employees, the restraint goes beyond the
intent of the collaboration.468
This question is central in franchise no-poaching cases and the
franchise justification will likely hinge on whether the restraint is
commensurate with and necessary to promote the larger
integration.469 In the franchise context, the DOJ seems to more
readily accept the franchise and franchisee relationship as a
potential justification in most franchises.470 It states that
“territorial allocation agreements are common in franchise and
analogous relationships. They serve to [increase interbrand
competition and] limit geographically ‘the number of sellers of a
particular product competing for the business of a given group of
buyers.’”471 It translates this justification to a no-poach restraint,
stating that it “is a vertical allocation agreement ‘limiting the
number of [employers] competing for . . . a given group of
[employees] . . . .”472
The DOJ relies on Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc.,
but in this case, a television manufacturer used territory
allocations to limit the sales of its products to the franchise
locations that it approved.473 In a manner that is reminiscent of the
Colgate discussion above, the restraint in Continental only
concerned the vertical relationship between manufacturer and
retailer.474 The Court narrowly recognized that “vertical
restrictions promote interbrand competition by allowing the
manufacturer to achieve certain efficiencies in the distribution of
468. See Polygram Holding, Inc., 416 F.3d 29 (limiting an ancillary restraint
to the products at issue in the collaboration between firms).
469. See infra notes 470–472 and accompanying text (describing the DOJ’s
position on a franchise system as a pro-competitive justification).
470. See Stigar, supra note 111, at 17 (“Accordingly, because vertical
territorial allocation agreements may have both procompetitive and
anticompetitive effects, courts evaluate their legality using the rule of reason’s
balancing approach.”).
471. See Stigar, supra note 111, at 17 (describing the rationale for the
potential pro-competitive benefits of franchise no-poach restraints).
472. See Stigar, supra note 111, at 17 (applying its theory in the no-poach
context).
473. See Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 38-39 (1977)
(describing the vertical restrictions).
474. See id. (describing the vertical restrictions).
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his products.”475 By limiting the “number of sellers of a particular
product competing for the business of a given group of buyers,” the
manufacturer can ensure and more easily monitor the quality of
its sellers, encourage increased investments in the sale of its
products, and standardize services offered by its retailers.476 The
vertical restriction was directly related to the distribution of its
goods and necessary to achieve these effects.477
This is not the case in franchise no-poach claims because the
restraints impact the horizontal labor market and are too
attenuated; as a result, no-poach provisions do not similarly
increase the efficiency of the franchisees within the brand.478 In
fact, the opposite result occurs; by completely eliminating
competition among franchisees for employees, the strongest
franchisees cannot freely compete for the most talented
employees.479 As a result, the franchisees have a less competitive
work force and this has a negative impact on the downstream
product or service market.480 A no-poach provision is not related to
the goal of promoting investment, increased efficiency, or
standardization of quality and services across the franchise.481
This is because a franchise no-poach restraint uses a vertical
relationship in one market to create a restriction in another; it is
not a purely vertical restraint that promotes the franchise or its
downstream products.482
Additionally, the Supreme Court took care in Continental TV
to distinguish the restraint from that in United States v. Topco
475. Id. at 54–55.
476. See id. at 54–57 (noting the intrabrand benefits of vertical restraints
between a manufacturer and retailer).
477. See id. at 38–39 (describing how its restraints were implemented
according to its marketing strategy to phase out wholesalers in favor of
specialized retailers).
478. See supra Part I.B (describing the anticompetitive effects of a no-poach
agreement).
479. See supra Part I.B.
480. See supra Part I.B.
481. See supra notes 475–477 and accompanying text (describing intrabrand
efficiencies of vertical restraints and how no-poach agreements disrupt
competition in downstream product markets).
482. See, e.g., Butler v. Jimmy John’s Franchise, LLC, 331 F. Supp. 3d 786,
795 (S.D. Ill. 2018) (recognizing vertical elements but stating that the “effects are
felt strictly at the horizontal level”).
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Associates (and reaffirmed that previous decision in a footnote).483
Topco was a cooperative association of independent regional
supermarket chains; its member supermarket chains wanted to
create a brand of food products that it could distribute through
associated supermarkets.484 However, “members [had] a veto of
sorts over actual or potential competition in the territorial areas in
which they are concerned.”485 Topco maintained that “it [needed]
territorial divisions to compete with larger chains . . . [and] the
association actually increases competition by enabling its
members to compete successfully with larger regional and national
chains.”486
This justification was rejected.487 The Supreme Court found
that Topco, a joint venture between horizontal competitors,
engaged in per se illegal horizontal market allocations by
restricting new members who operated too closely to the existing
members.488 The purpose of the restraint was not necessary or
related to the purpose of promoting the brand (the joint venture)
but was a separate mechanism to shelter its members from
competition.489 Although Topco can be distinguished from
franchises in that the members of the association had very
significant control over the venture, making the restraint more
clearly horizontal, this question is still a factual one to be decided

483. See Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 57 n. 27 (1977)
(“United States v. Topco Associates . . . is not to the contrary, for it involved a
horizontal restriction among ostensible competitors.”).
484. See United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 598-601 (1972)
(describing the Topco Associates venture).
485. Id. at 602.
486. Id. at 605.
487. See id. at 606 (“The [district] court held that Topco's practices were
procompetitive and, therefore, consistent with the purposes of the antitrust laws.
But we conclude that the District Court used an improper analysis in reaching its
result.”).
488. See id. at 609 (finding that the restraints were per se illegal, matching
the types of restraints found in United States v. Sealy Inc.).
489. See id. (“Just as in this case, Sealy agreed with the licensees not to license
other manufacturers or sellers to sell Sealy-brand products in a designated
territory in exchange for the promise of the licensee who sold in that territory not
to expand its sales beyond the area demarcated by Sealy.”).
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in each case.490
C. The Justifications Must Actually Promote Competition
Finally, the Sherman Act is limited to the protection of
competition, reflecting society’s judgment that competition is the
best method to ensure fair prices and high-quality products.491 As
a result, justifications that go beyond this limited inquiry should
be squarely rejected; the antitrust laws do not support “a defense
based on the assumption that competition itself is
unreasonable.”492 These types of arguments generally possess the
defect of focusing on speculative long-term effects, allowing firms
in cartels to dominate stronger firms when natural market forces
would have eliminated them, or acknowledging short-term losses
exchanged for uncertain future benefits.493
This seems to have been an undercurrent in Topco as well.494
The Court rejected the defendant’s argument that “it needs
territorial divisions to compete with larger chains” and that the
“anti-competitive effect [of] these practices . . . is far outweighed by
the increased ability of Topco members to compete both with the
national chains and other supermarkets operating in their
respective territories.”495 If the Court had accepted this argument,
it would have essentially taken the position that “competition itself
is unreasonable.”496 If natural market forces result in the demise
of smaller grocery chains in favor of larger chains, that is the will
490. See id. at 598 (“All of the stock in Topco is owned by the members . . . .
The board of directors, which controls the operation of the association, is drawn
from the members and is normally composed of high-ranking executive officers of
member chains.”).
491. See Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 695 (1978)
(rejecting the argument that a restraint is justified by the dangers of inferior
engineering services).
492. See id. (recognizing that the argument that public policy dictates against
competition is inconsistent with the Sherman Act).
493. See 11 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 28, § 1906(b) (1998) (noting the
defects of arguments that restriction of competition is necessary).
494. See United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 605 (1972) (describing
the defendant’s justification).
495. Id.
496. See Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs, 435 U.S. at 695 (rejecting the argument
that a restraint is justified by the dangers of inferior engineering services).
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of market and this result is not to be deterred by a conspiracy that
artificially props up less efficient firms.497 Variations of this
argument, such as the argument that certain restraints are
necessary to withstand “ruinous competition” or to stabilize a
market have also been squarely rejected by the Supreme Court.498
And arguments that restraints are necessary in a shortage of labor
or to balance losses in one market meet similar results.499
Finally, one argument that seems compelling at first is that a
decrease in labor costs will lead to efficiencies by increasing a
firm’s profitability and ability to create additional output for the
consumers in other markets.500 This argument appeared to be

497. See id. at 689 (“[I]t cannot be argued that monopolistic arrangements in
a particular industry having special characteristics should be allowed because
such monopolistic arrangements will better promote trade and commerce than
competition.”).
498. See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 221–22 (1940)
(“Congress has not left with us the determination of whether or not particular
price-fixing schemes are wise or unwise, healthy or destructive. It has not
permitted the age-old cry of ruinous competition and competitive evils to be a
defense to price-fixing conspiracies.”); United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273
U.S. 392, 397 (1927) (“The reasonable price fixed today may through economic
and business changes become the unreasonable price of to-morrow. Once
established, it may be maintained and unchanged because of the absence of
competition secured by the agreement for a price reasonable when fixed.”);
United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass’n, 166 U.S. 290, 331 (1897)
To the question why competition should necessarily be conduct to such
an extent as to result in this relentless and continued war, to eventuate
only in the financial ruin of one or all of the companies indulging in it,
the answer is made that, if competing railroad companies be left
subject to the sway of free and unrestricted competition, the results
above foreshadowed necessarily happen from the nature of the case.
499. See NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85 (1984) (rejecting the idea that
restrictions in televising games were necessary to protect a separate market for
live game attendance); Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 46 U.S. 643, 648
(1980) (rejecting the premise that eliminating competition in credit terms would
refocus price competition); Nat’l Macaroni Mfrs. Ass’n v. FTC, 345 F.2d 421, 423
(7th Cir. 1986) (noting that an association’s restraint on durum and wheat used
to manufacture macaroni were not justified by shortages in these markets); Hosp.
Corp. of Am. V. FTC, 807 F.2d 1381 (7th Cir. 1986) (rejecting the argument that
price coordination in one merging market would be offset by competition in other
services).
500. See supra notes 423–435 and accompanying text (reviewing the
pro-competitive justifications asserted in Polk and Broadcast Music).
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vindicated in Polk and Broadcast Music.501 However, in these
cases, the restraints actually increased competition, created new
and tangible competitive offerings, and were necessary to facilitate
greater collaboration between the firms.502 No-poach agreements
do not fulfill these requirements; they instead appear to be
attempts to increase revenue with speculative future benefits.503
The mere profitability of a practice or the creation of cost savings
does not qualify as a defense under the Sherman Act; after all,
what would stop a firm from simply pocketing the profits?504 From
a more technical standpoint, these profits should also not qualify
as efficiencies since they do not benefit the relevant market for
labor. 505
Finally, antitrust law also does not tend to apply rule of reason
analysis to the “costs of operating the competitive market itself.”506
For example, information and other advertising costs are
necessary to ensure ongoing competition between firms.507 The
Supreme Court has explicitly recognized the necessity of correcting
this information and other market information asymmetries.508
The costs of competing for labor and the information asymmetries
501. See supra notes 423–435 and accompanying text (reviewing the
pro-competitive justifications asserted in Polk, Broadcast Music, and Board of
Regents).
502. See supra notes 423–435 and accompanying text (reviewing the
pro-competitive justifications asserted in Polk and Broadcast Music).
503. See supra note 493 and accompanying text (describing how arguments
that are unrelated to the goal of increasing competition often have the effect of
asserting speculative future benefits).
504. See Polygram Holding, Inc. v. FTC, 416 F.3d 29, 38 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (“A
restraint cannot be justified solely on the ground that it increases the profitability
of the enterprise that introduces the new product . . . .”).
505. See, e.g., MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 405, § 7.2 (stating that merger
specific efficiencies are only recognized if they “would be sufficient to reverse the
merger’s potential to harm customers in the relevant market, e.g., by preventing
price increases in that market”).
506. See 11 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 28, § 1907 (1998) (highlighting
antitrust law’s goal of promoting competition rather than quelling these
processes).
507. See 11 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 28, § 1907 (1998) (“[A] sine qua
non of a well-functioning market is well informed participants and an agreement
not to advertise threatens the right of consumers to become well informed.”).
508. See Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 764 (1999) (stating that
advertising restrictions could restrain price although the probability of this harm
was uncertain).
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for wage information that no-poach agreements create fall
squarely into this protected category.509 As a result, justifications
for no-poach restraints—which have the effect of manipulating
information costs in the labor market—are inherently suspect and
have few plausible pro-competitive purposes.510
V. Conclusion
Although the prosecution of no-poach restraints is relatively
new and relevant jurisprudence is pending in this area, basic
doctrinal principles of antitrust law support their condemnation.
The nature of these restraints is inherently horizontal because
they create restrictions between competitors in the labor
market.511 A horizontal agreement can also be found via a hub-andspoke theory in franchise cases.512 A horizontal agreement can also
include companies which are vertically related in certain markets
(still competitors in the same labor market).513 And when these
employers enter into no-poach agreements, they form cartels.514
They are motivated by a shared desire to depress the wages of
employees and reduce employee turnover between them.515 This
type of agreement is unlikely to occur in the absence of collusion
since employers are usually motivated to compete against each
other for the best employees.516
509. See No-Poach Approach, supra note 59 (“Robbing employees of labor
market competition deprives them of job opportunities, information, and the
ability to use competing offers to negotiate better terms of employment.”).
510. See, e.g., Deslandes v. McDonald’s USA, LLC, No. 17 C 4857, 2018 WL
3105955, at *8 (N.D. Ill. June 25, 2018) (“Dividing the market does not promote
intrabrand competition for employees, it stifles interbrand competition.”).
511. See supra Part I.C.1 (discussing the antitrust agencies’ theory on nopoach restraints).
512. See supra Part II.C. (arguing that the hub-and-spoke theory may be
applicable to franchise no-poach restraints).
513. See supra notes 311–324 and accompanying text (describing how nopoach agreements should be viewed as horizontal restraints).
514. See supra note 55 and accompanying text (explaining how the agencies
have described no-poach agreements as “hardcore cartel conduct”).
515. See supra note 32 and accompanying text (explaining that competition
in the labor market provides employees with higher wages, among other things).
516. See supra notes 61–65 and accompanying text (detailing the effects of nopoach agreements).
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Because no-poach agreements are—in form and effect—
horizontal market allocation agreements, the agencies’ position
that they warrant per se condemnation is appropriate.517 In the
alternative, no-poach agreements are well suited for quick-look
analysis given their inherently anticompetitive nature and direct
impact on price information in the labor market.518 There is a
strong case for either per se or quick-look condemnation.519 And
although the extended rule of reason is the standard of last resort
for an antitrust plaintiff, it is possible to prevail under this
standard as well, especially where the affected employees have
specialized roles.520
The antitrust plaintiff’s real challenge is meeting the initial
burden.521 Once this has been accomplished, it is unlikely that a
defendant can successfully raise a pro-competitive justification
defense and receive a more lenient standard of review, such as the
rule of reason.522 Only in limited circumstances are no-poach
agreements truly ancillary to integrations between firms,
necessary for the larger venture, and pro-competitive in their
purpose.523 A close examination of no-poach agreements reflects
their anticompetitive nature and dearth of efficiencies or
justifications.524 Luckily, antitrust jurisprudence has evolved over
517. See supra notes 56–60 and accompanying text (stating the antitrust
agencies’ position on the legal treatment of no-poach agreements).
518. See discussion supra Part III.B (discussing the applicability of the quicklook rule in no-poach cases given their direct impact on price and output).
519. See discussion supra Parts III.A–B (examining the applicability of the
per se and quick-look rule in no-poach cases).
520. See discussion supra Part III.C (describing how a no-poach plaintiff
should approach an extended rule of reason analysis).
521. See supra Parts IV.A–C (describing how no-poach restraints are likely to
fail under the ancillary restraints doctrine).
522. See supra Parts IV.A–C (stating that once a no-poach plaintiff meets
their burden under either the per se, quick-look, or extended rule of reason
standard, it is unlikely that a defendant will be able to assert a pro-competition
justification).
523. See supra Parts IV.A–C (explaining that a pro-competitive justification
offered must promote an integrative venture, serve a pro-competitive purpose,
and be commensurate or necessary to achieve the intended purpose).
524. See supra Parts II.B (describing how no-poach restraints, on their face,
are anticompetitive even to those with only a rudimentary understanding of
economics), IV (noting no-poach restraints’ lack of redeeming qualities or procompetitive purposes).
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the years to carve out several places to reject these types of
restraints.

